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Introduction
Just weeks before the 1992 election Congress handed President Bush
the first and only veto override of his presidency. When Congress over-
whelmingly voted to override the veto and enact the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Cable Act"
or the "Act"),1 it broke the President's streak of thirty-five successful
vetoes. This moment of mild political drama is already a mere footnote
in the history of the Bush Administration and the 1992 presidential cam-
paign, but the far-reaching new law completely overhauls the legal rules
governing the television marketplace, and its impact will be felt for years
to come. Enactment of the 1992 Cable Act was the conclusion of a long,
tumultuous legislative process involving enormous stakes and a wide ar-
ray of competing, and often powerful, interests. Its enactment, however,
also marks the beginning of a new regulatory era whose legal features are
far from fully defined. The 1992 Cable Act contains complex, interre-
lated, and often intentionally vague provisions that revise rules pertain-
ing to cable television, broadcast television, and new television
technologies such as direct broadcast satellite and wireless cable. It
changes the regulatory role of the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") and local municipal franchise authorities over the video mar-
ketplace and affects the rates cable customers will pay. The evolution of
the new rules will be determined by several upcoming FCC rulemaking
proceedings2 and the outcome of the many lawsuits that already have
1. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-555 (1992)).
On October 5, 1992, the U.S. Senate voted 74-25 to override the veto. 138 CONG. REC. S16,676
(daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992). The U.S. House of Representatives voted 308-114 to override the
veto. 138 CONG. REC. HI 1,487-88 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992). Previously, in September 1992, the
respective votes favoring passage of the 1992 Cable Act were 280-128 in the House and 74-25
in the Senate. 138 CONG. REC. H8687 (daily ed, Sept. 17, 1992); 138 CONG. REC. S4616 (daily
ed. Sept. 21, 1992).
2. The FCC has initiated or is scheduled to initiate rulemaking proceedings on the fol-
lowing: (1) Program access and program carriage agreements (MM Dkt. No. 92-265, FCC 92-
543 (Dec. 24, 1992)); (2) Cable rate regulation (MM Dkt. No. 92-266, FCC 92-544 (Dec. 24,
1992)) (On Apr. 1, 1993, the FCC announced the adoption of the program access and rate
regulation rules.) Reports and Orders forthcoming; (3) Restricting children's access to inde-
cent programming on leased access channels, and prohibition of obscene and other material on
public, educational, or governmental ("PEG") access channels (MM Dkt. No. 92-258, FCC
92-498 (Nov. 10, 1992)); (4) Cable home wiring (MM Dkt. No. 92-260, FCC 92-500 (Nov. 6,
1992)) (Report and Order, 93-73 (released Feb. 2, 1993)); (5) Must-carry and retransmission
consent (MM Dkt. No. 92-259, FCC 92-499 (Nov. 19, 1992)) (On Mar. 11, 1993, the FCC
announced the completion of the Must Carry and Retransmission Consent rules.) Report and
Order forthcoming; (6) Cable tier "buy-through" prohibition (MM Dkt. No. 92-262, FCC 92-
540 (Dec. 11, 1992)) (On Mar. 11, 1993, the FCC announced the adoption of tier "buy-
through" regulations.) Report and Order forthcoming; (7) Cable consumer protection and cus-
tomer service (MM Dkt. No. 92-263, FCC 92-541 (Dec. 11, 1992)) (On Mar. 11, 1993, the
FCC announced the establishment of customer service standards that will become effective on
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been filed challenging key provisions of the new Act, 3 as well as by re-
lated legislation introduced in the 103d Congress.4
This article describes and analyzes the major provisions of the 1992
Cable Act in light of its extensive legislative history, focusing on three of
the most important statutory provisions: (1) access to cable program-
ming for cable competitors; (2) retransmission of commercial broadcast
signals; and (3) regulation of cable rates. The article also identifies sev-
eral issues that Congress left to be resolved by the FCC and discusses the
relevant rulemaking procedures required by Congress in order to imple-
ment the 1992 Cable Act. The article suggests solutions to dilemmas
confronting the FCC and evaluates the prospects of the 1992 Cable Act
to fulfill the stated intent of Congress to stimulate competition and re-
duce prices for cable consumers.
Overview of the Legislative History
No major legislation is born suddenly and fully-formed like Athena
springing from the head of Zeus. The gestation of the 1992 Cable Act
was typically long and perhaps unusually arduous. Its key features were
developed over five or more years. Mandatory references for examining
the 1992 Cable Act include: the Conference Committee Report accom-
panying S. 12;' the floor debates accompanying consideration of the Con-
July 1, 1993.) Report and Order forthcoming; (8) Equal employment opportunity policies and
practices (MM Dkt. No. 92-261, FCC 92-539 (Jan. 5, 1993)); (9) Interim Report to Congress
on sports migration (due July 1, 1993); (10) Cable ownership rules (MM Dkt. No. 92-264,
FCC 92-542 (Dec. 28, 1992)).
3. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, No. 92-2247 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 1992) (chal-
lenges the constitutionality of §§ 4, 5, and 6 of the 1992 Cable Act); Daniel's Cablevision, Inc.
v. United States, No. 92-2292 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 1992) (challenges the constitutionality of §§ 4,
5, and 6 of the 1992 Cable Act); Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. FCC, No. 92-2494
(D.D.C. Nov. 5, 1992) (challenges §§ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7(b)(4)(b) and (c), 9, 10(d), 11, 15, 19, 24, and
25 of the 1992 Cable Act); Discovery Communications, Inc. v. United States, No. 92-2558
(D.D.C. Nov. 5, 1992) (challenges §§ 3, 9, and 19 of the 1992 Cable Act); and National Cable
Television Assoc., Inc. v. United States, No. 92-2495 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 1992) (challenges §§ 4,5,
and 6 of the 1992 Cable Act).
4. For example, House Judiciary Committee opponents of the Retransmission Consent
provisions contained in § 6 of the 1992 Cable Act have introduced two bills to amend the new
law: H.R. 12, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1993) (introduced by House Intellectual
Property Subcommittee Chair William Hughes (D-NJ) and the ranking Subcommittee minor-
ity member Carlos Moorhead (R-CA)); and H.R. 190, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (daily ed. Jan. 6,
1993) (introduced on Jan. 5, 1993, by Subcommittee member Barney Frank (D-MA), which
would repeal the new retransmission consent provisions outright).
5. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 862, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 138 CONG. REC. H8308
(daily ed. Sept. 14, 1992) ("Conference Report").
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ference Report6 and the eventually successful veto override;7 the earlier
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee report on S.
12;8 and the House Energy and Commerce Committee report accompa-
nying H.R. 4850.1
The formal legislative history of the 1992 Cable Act, extensive as it
is, represents just the tip of the iceberg of related legislative materials and
events that shaped its final language. For example, as early as the Fourth
of July recess of 1989, there were at least a dozen bills pending in Con-
gress that related to the cable television industry.1" The provisions of
6. 138 CONG. REC. S14,600-16 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1992); 138 CONG. REC. S14,222-51
(daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992); 138 CONG. REC. H8671-87 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1992).
Additional floor debates on the 1992 Cable Act include 138 CONG. REC. S400-33 (daily
ed. Jan. 27, 1992); 138 CONG. REC. S561-611 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1992); 138 CONG. REC. S635-
97 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992); 138 CONG. REC. S711-70 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1992); 138 CONG.
REC. S16,652-77 and H11,477-88 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992); and 138 CONG. REC. H6531-44
(daily ed. July 23, 1992).
7. See 138 CONG. REC. S16,676 and H8687, supra note 1, for the Senate and House
override votes.
8. S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) ("Senate Report"). The House Bill, H.R.
4850, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), did not contain a retransmission consent provision, and the
conference agreement adopted the Senate retransmission consent language. Therefore the Sen-
ate Report is especially important on this issue.
9. H.R. REP. No. 628, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) ("House Report").
10. S. 168, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 1816-17 (1989) (The Cable Television
Programming Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 1989, introduced by Senator
Pressler (R-SD), prohibited price discrimination and exclusive distributorship for satellite-de-
livered programming.); S. 177, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 1830-31 (1989) (The
Cable Compulsory License Non-Discrimination Act of 1989 provided compulsory licenses only
to those cable systems that provided adequate carriage of local broadcast signals. It was intro-
duced by Senators DeConcini (D-AZ), Metzenbaum (D-OH), Simon (D-IL), and Pressler on
Jan. 25, 1989. H.R. 109, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), a companion bill, was introduced by
Representative Bryant (D-TX).); S. 833, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 5,7006-09
(1989) (The Cable Television Subscriber Protection Act of 1989 redefined the term "effective
competition" under the 1984 Cable Act to allow regulation of basic cable service rates, unless
the cable community was served by more than one multichannel (non-broadcast) video pro-
gramming distributor. It also exempted from rate regulation cable systems that have less than
30% penetration in their franchise areas. This bill was introduced by Senators Metzenbaum
and Lieberman (D-CT).); S. 834, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 5,7006-09 (1989)
(The Competition in Cable Television Act of.1989 prohibited unreasonable discrimination in the
sale of programming to multichannel video programming distributors, and prohibited any one
cable company from owning systems that serve more than 25% of the cable subscribers in the
country. This bill was introduced by Senators Metzenbaum, Pressler, and Lieberman.); S. 905,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 6,7962 (1989) (The Cable Consumer Protection Act of
1989 amended § 623 of the 1984 Cable Act to allow regulation of cable rates and permitted
states or franchising authorities to regulate cable service. The proposal also authorized a state
to deny a cable franchise renewal or transfer of ownership or control of a cable system on the
grounds of extensive media ownership, and conditioned the granting of compulsory licenses
upon carriage of local broadcast signals. The bill was introduced by Senator Lieberman.); S.
1068, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 7,9806 (1989) (The Cable Competition Act repre-
sented the effort of Senator Al Gore (D-TN) to offer a comprehensive, multititle legislative
solution to the problems he saw facing the television consumer. This bill allowed franchising
[Vol. 15:305
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these earlier bills are easily identifiable as forerunners of significant sec-
tions of the 1992 Cable Act. Additionally, over thirty pieces of legisla-
tion had been introduced in fourteen different states, and an increasing
number of cities and other local jurisdictions had ordinances pending or
passed that related to cable television.l' By the time of final passage, the
Senate Commerce Committee had held eleven hearings, 12 and the Senate
Communications Subcommittee had held thirteen hearings on cable-re-
lated issues, including over fifty hours of testimony from 113 different
witnesses.' 3 The House Subcommittee on Telecommunications held sev-
eral days of hearings on a predecessor bill, H.R. 1303, which passed the
full House in the 101st Congress. Both the House Subcommittee and the
authorities in areas without competition to regulate rates for the so-called "life-line" service,
defined as the lowest priced tier including local broadcast signals. It also allowed telephone
companies ("telcos") to provide cable services inside and outside their service areas. The bill
further required cable operators, including common carriers, to provide access to the system
for all programming services, unless it was not feasible due to channel capacity limitations or
because the nature of the program and content did not comport with local standards. It also
contained provisions to ensure that programming services affiliated with cable operators would
be available to all program distributors on a non-discriminatory basis. Senators Gorton (R-
WA) and Ford (D-KY) joined Senator Gore as original co-sponsors.); H.R. 1304, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 3,3690 (1989) (This bill repealed § 625(d) of the Communications
Act, which permitted cable companies operating in communities where rates are deregulated
to "rearrange a particular service from one service tier to another." It was introduced by
Representative Donnelly (D-MA)); H.R. 1375, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 3,4033
(1989) (The Cable Rate Disclosure Act of 1989 required cable operators to disclose their rates
and services to the FCC, and further required the FCC to publish reports on cable rates. The
bill was introduced by Representative Schumer (D-NY).); H.R. 2128, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
135 CONG. REC. 6,7543 (1989) (This bill required cable operators to obtain approval from
their franchising authority prior to increasing rates for basic cable service by more than either
five percent or the percentage increase in the consumer price index for the previous year. This
bill was introduced by Representative Payne (D-VA).); H.R. 2222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135
CONG. REC. 6,8072 (1989) (The Cable Consumer Protection Act of 1989 amended the 1984
Cable Act to allow reregulation of rates. It was the companion bill to S. 905. It was intro-
duced by Representative Shays.); H.R. 2437, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 8,9996
(1989) (The Cable Competition Act of 1989 was the companion bill to Senator Gore's omnibus
measure, S. 1068, but it varied somewhat in that it required a franchise authority to affirma-
tively find that telco purchase of a local cable system was in the public interest before the
phone company could complete a deal. It was introduced by Representative Boucher (D-VA)
and fourteen co-sponsors.); H.R. 2363, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 7,9406 (1989)
(The Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1989, introduced by Representative Lent (R-
NY), amended the 1984 Cable Act to require carriage of local professional sports teams and
local broadcast stations. The measure also prohibited exclusive distribution agreements under
certain circumstances and would place a 10-year limit on franchise agreements.); and H.R.
2643, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 9,11818 (1989) (The Cable Television Foreign
Ownership Act of 1989 was sponsored by House Telecommunications Chairman Markey (D-
MA). This bill restricted foreign ownership of cable, wireless cable, and direct broadcast satel-
lite systems.). See discussion of these bills in Nicholas Allard & Deborah Chaskes, Summer
Heat Changes Political Climate, PRIVATE CABLE, Aug. 1989, at 22, 26-28.
11. Allard & Chaskes, supra note 10, at 25-26.
12. See Senate Report, supra note 8, at 3.
13. 138 CONG. REC. S561 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1992).
1993]
full Energy and Commerce Committee devoted several days of extensive
"mark up" sessions prior to reporting the House version of the bill, H.R.
4850,14 which eventually became law in the 102d Congress. A wide ar-
ray of other public proceedings, including Congressional Antitrust in-
quiries in the House in 1987 and in the Senate in 1988,15 a 1988 National
Telecommunications and Information Administration Study,16 FCC in-
quiries,17 activities of the National Association of Attorneys General,18
and surveys of the U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO"), 9 also ex-
amined developments in the cable television marketplace and expanded
the ample record being developed before several Congressional commit-
tees. Finally, the rationale and legal analysis underlying the provisions
14. See House Report, supra note 9, at 74.
15. Office of U.S. Congressman Charles E. Schumer, Cable Television v. The Alternatives:
A Study in Antitrust, Sept. 14, 1987 (on file with Congressman Schumer's office); Subcommit-
tee on Antitrust, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Survey on the Availability
of Programming to Cable Competitors (Oct. 3, 1988) (on file with the Subcommittee). At least
initially fledgling cable competitors found Congress to be more receptive to the antitrust and
competition aspects of their problems rather than the communications policy aspects of their
failure to expand into the market. The early activity in this area in the respective antitrust
subcommittees helped to stimulate the committees with communications jurisdiction, which
had been influenced substantially up to that time by established industries, including the cable
industry, to exercise their communications jurisdiction and increase their scrutiny of the obsta-
cles blocking would-be cable competitors from entering the market.
16. National Telecommunications and Information Administration Telecom 2000 (Oct.
1988) (available from the U.S. Government Printing Office) ("NTIA Telecom 2000").
17. See e.g., In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's Policies Relat-
ing to the Provision of Cable Television Service, Notice of Inquiry, 5 FCC Rcd. 362 (1989);
Inquiry into the Existence of Discrimination in the Provision of Superstation and Network
Station Programming, Notice of Inquiry, 4 FCC Rcd. 3883 (1989); Inquiry into the Existence
of Discrimination in the Provision of Superstation and Network Station Programming, Report,
5 FCC Rcd. 523 (1989); Inquiry into the Existence of Discrimination in the Provision of
Superstation and Network Station Programming, Further Notice of Inquiry, 5 FCC Rcd. 3760
(1990); Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's Policies Relating to the Provi-
sion of Cable Television Service, Report, 5 FCC Rcd. 4962 (1990); Inquiry into the Existence
of Discrimination in the Provision of Superstation and Network Station Programming, Second
Report, 6 FCC Rcd. 3312 (1991).
18. In 1989, the National Association of Attorneys General's Antitrust Task Force began
an investigation into allegations that members of the cable industry conspired to deny pro-
gramming to noncable distributors of programming to consumers. The Task Force was made
up of members from Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, West Virginia,
Texas, Ohio, and California. See Statement by Charles G. Brown, West Virginia Attorney
General (Mar. 15, 1988); Cable Television: Was Regulation Right or Wrong?, ABA section of
Antitrust Law, A National Symposium on Competition in the Cable Television Industry (June
12, 1990); see also Rachel Thompson, Attorneys General Threaten Primestar Suit, MUL-
TICHANNEL NEWS (Jan. 13, 1992); Subscription Prices Worry Attorney General, BROADCAST-
ING (Mar. 21, 1988).
19. United States General Accounting Office, Telecommunications: Nat'l Survey of Cable
Television Rates and Services (Aug. 3, 1989) and GAO, Follow-up Nat'l Survey of Cable Televi-
sion Rates and Services (June 13, 1990).
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governing retransmission of broadcast signals evolved from almost thirty
years of litigation and rulemaking.20
I
Access to Programming
Competition cannot exist if competitors have nothing to sell. The
key to success in the cable industry is marketing popular programs to
consumers. Contrary to the fundamental premise of the Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984, which essentially deregulated the
cable television industry on the assumption that cable would face
effective competition,21 cable has become a monopoly over the local
distribution of multiple channels of video programming.22 In all but a
small percentage of communities, the local franchised cable operator is
the sole distributor of subscription television,23 and other potential
multichannel video programming distributors,24 including "wireless
20. See discussion of this history in the Senate Report, supra note 8, at 34-62, and the
House Report, supra note 9, at 47-74.
21. One of the stated purposes of the 1984 Cable Act was to "promote competition in
cable communications .. " Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549,
98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521-11 (1992)) ("1984 Cable Act"). The Senate
found that "a uniform national policy for broadband telecommunications can serve to elimi-
nate and prevent conflicting and counterproductive regulations so that cable can be a competi-
tive medium . . . ." S. REP. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1983). See also House Report,
supra note 9, at 30 ("[T]he competition to cable system operators from other providers of video
programming that the Committee anticipated during consideration of the 1984 Act, such as
wireless and private cable operators, cable overbuilders, the home satellite dish market, and
direct broadcast satellite operators, largely has failed to [emerge].").
22. "[M]ost cable television subscribers have no opportunity to select between competing
cable systems. Without the presence of another multichannel video programming distributor,
a cable system faces no local competition." 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 2(a)(2) (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521). See Glenn B. Manishin, Antitrust and Regulation in Cable Televi-
sion: Federal Policy at War With Itself, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 75 (1987) (federal
policy applied neither regulation nor antitrust to cable television).
23. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 2(a)(2) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521); Senate
Report, supra note 8, at 8-11, 13 (discussing monopoly status and power of cable). The Senate
Report noted that out of over 11,000 communities with cable systems, there were only 53 with
any degree of competition from another cable system (known as an "overbuild"). Id. at 13.
See also the complaint filed in Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Time, Inc., No. 89-3139 (S.D.N.Y. May 9,
1989) ("Each cable operator is a monopolist in its local market or possesses a monopoly share
approaching 100 percent.").
24. A multichannel video programming distributor ("multichannel distributor" or
"MVPD") is defined in the 1992 Cable Act as "a person such as, but not limited to, a cable
operator, a multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct broadcast satellite service, or
a television receive-only satellite program distributor, who makes available for purchase, by
subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video programming." 1992 Cable Act, supra
note 1, § 2(c)(6) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 522(c)(12)) (Wireless cable operators employ
microwave spectrum that includes multichannel multipoint distribution services.). This defini-
tion is used throughout the 1992 Cable Act: (1) it determines the entities afforded program
access (Q 19) and involved in the program coverage rule (§ 12); (2) it defines the entities subject
19931 THE 1992 CABLE ACT
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cable,"'2 5 Satellite Master Antenna Television ("SMATV" or "private
cable"),26 television receive only ("TVRO" or "home satellite dish"),"
and direct broadcast satellite ("DBS"),28 have not yet made significant
inroads into the market as head-to-head competitors. These potential
cable competitors complained that they were blocked from entering local
markets and from providing a competitive service because they were un-
able to carry the subscription programming that makes cable television
so popular with consumers-programs such as HBO, Showtime,
Cinemax, TNT, ESPN, regional sports channels, and others. Indeed,
Congress found that the cable industry had become highly concen-
to retransmission consent requirements (§ 6); (3) it is used in the effective competition defini-
tion while determining rate regulations (§ 3); and (4) it is used in the equal employment oppor-
tunity provisions (§ 22).
25. "Wireless cable" systems use the Super High Frequency ("SHF") portion of the radio
frequency spectrum to transmit multiple channels of video programming from terrestrial
transmitters to small antennas mounted on subscribers' rooftops. Wireless cable is able to
provide multichannel programming using a combination of the following services: multipoint
distribution service ("MDS"), multichannel multipoint distribution service ("MMDS"), in-
structional fixed television services ("IFTS"), and the former operational fixed service
("OFS"). Through its combination of services, wireless cable can now provide up to 33 chan-
nels. The FCC first allocated spectrum for wireless cable over a decade ago. See In re Amend-
ment of Parts 2, 21, 74 and 94 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations in regard to
frequency allocation to the Instructional Television Fixed Service, the Multipoint Distribution
Service, and the Private Operational Fixed Microwave Service, Report and Order, 94 F.C.C.2d
1203, 1228 (1983); In re Various Methods of Transmitting Program Material to Hotels and
Similar Locations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 715 (1983). The FCC's
rules and policies governing wireless cable have been significantly modified in recent years. See
In re Amendment of Parts 1, 2, and 21 of the Commission's Rules Governing Use of the
Frequencies in the 2.1 and 2.5 GHz Bands, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 7 FCC Rcd. 3266
n.8 (1992).
26. SMATV serves private, multi-unit dwellings, hotels, motels, bars, residential develop-
ments and subdivisions. An SMATV system connects a master antenna television system
("MATV"), which links, for example, the units in a dwelling to a single external television
antenna, and a television receive-only satellite earth station ("TVRO"). In effect an SMATV
system is a mini-cable system employing cable that does not cross public rights of way.
27. Television receive-only satellite earth stations, otherwise known as home satellite
dishes or backyard dishes, are used to receive satellite-delivered programming. These dishes
"access primarily C-band satellite transponders and in some instances access Ku-band tran-
sponders." Senate Report, supra note 8, at 15. C-band antennas are usually approximately ten
feet in diameter. Ku-band antennas are roughly three feet or less in diameter.
28. DBS is a radio communication service in which signals from earth are uplinked and
retransmitted by high-power, geostationary satellites for direct reception by small, relatively
inexpensive earth terminals. Inquiry into the development of policy in regard to Direct Broad-
cast Satellites, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 677 n.1 (1982). DBS service will deliver multichannel pro-
gramming service directly to small home dishes less than two feet in diameter via satellites
operating in the DBS band. When DBS becomes operational it is expected to be able to deliver
over 100 channels of video programming directly to the home.
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trated29 and that the resulting vertical"° and horizontal3" concentration
created an imbalance of power between cable operators and program-
mers, as well as between cable operators and would-be multichannel
competitors.32
According to cable competitors and some programmers, existing
cable systems influence the distribution of programming in two ways.
First, cable operators often purchase ownership interests in programmers
and thereby directly control the availability of programming. In fact,
some cable operators require a financial interest in the programmer as a
condition of carriage of its programs.3 3 These vertically integrated cable
operators have the incentive and the ability to favor their affiliated pro-
grammers. This makes it more difficult for unaffiliated programmers to
obtain carriage on cable systems.34 Conversely, Congress found that ver-
tically integrated programmers also have the incentive and the ability to
favor their affiliated cable operators over unaffiliated cable operators and
other competitors, such as wireless cable, SMATV, and TVRO distribu-
tors.35 Vertically integrated cable programmers often refuse to offer pro-
gramming to competing cable systems or to alternative technologies, or
do so only at discriminatory prices and conditions.36
29. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 2(a)(4) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 609); House
Report, supra note 9, at 40-43.
30. Cable companies often hold ownership interest in programmers. For example, Tele-
Communications, Inc. ("TCI"), the largest cable system operator, has financial interests in
programming services such as American Movie Classics, the Discovery Channel, QVC Net-
works, Inc., and Encore. Viacom has a financial interest in MTV, Showtime, Nickelodeon,
and VH-l. TCI and Viacom together have an interest in HBO. Senate Report, supra note 8,
at 24-29; House Report, supra note 9, at 41.
31. "Horizontal concentration refers to the share of cable subscribers accounted for by the
largest MSOs [Multiple System Operators]." House Report, supra note 9, at 42. In 1985,
approximately 29% of all cable subscribers were served by the five largest MSOs. As of the
end of 1990, the top five MSOs served almost half of the nation's subscribers: TCI serves
approximately 24% of cable's total subscribers, Time Warner's cable subsidiary reaches about
12% of the total subscribers, and the next three largest MSOs serve about 11% of the nation's
subscribers. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 32; see also House Report, supra note 9, at 42-43.
32. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 2(a)(2) and (5) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 609).
33. 138 CONG. REC. S562 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1992) (comments of Senator Inouye). See
also Senate Report, supra note 8, at 24; House Report, supra note 9, at 41.
34. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 2(a)(5) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 609).
35. Id.
36. Chairman Inouye's committee found that "cable operators who own program services
have consistently denied dish owners and other multichannel video services programming or
made the programming available at prices much higher than those paid by cable operators."
138 CONG. REC. S563-64 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1992) (comments of Senator Inouye). See also
Conference Report, supra note 5, at 56-58.
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Second, in addition to the control afforded by affiliations, cable oper-
ators also use their monopsony power to pressure programmers.3 7 The
top five cable firms control almost half of the nation's cable subscribers.38
Programmers are fearful of losing their largest customers and of other
forms of retribution,39 and yield to the cable operators' influence by re-
fusing to sell to their competitors, or by demanding that competitors pay
an excessive price for the same programs offered to cable operators at
reasonable rates.40
Recognition by Congress of the possible benefits of both vertical and
horizontal integration, such as economies of scale and the financial abil-
37. See Senate Report, supra note 8, at 23-28 and House Report, supra note 9, at 36-40.
For example,
[o]ne company, ESPN, has actually admitted privately that such [economic] pressure
has been brought to bear on them. In fact, ESPN has quietly urged one MMDS
company to sue them so that they could get out from under the cable pressure and
begin to do business with the wireless cable companies.
Office of U.S. Congressman Charles E. Schumer, Cable Television v. The Alternatives, supra
note 15, at 7.
38. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 32.
39. Many examples of the power of cable MSOs are cited in the legislative history of the
1992 Cable Act. See generally Senate Report, supra note 8, at 14-17, 23-34; House Report,
supra note 9, at 43-46; Floor Debates, supra note 6; Paul Farhi, Regulating Cable A Political
Response to a Wired Nation, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1992, at AI; Paul Farhi, Fear, Loathing
and Respectfor Cable's Leader-TCI's Size Draws Controversy, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1992, at
Al; and Paul Farhi, Fighting For a Leading Edge on the Future, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1992, at
Al (the series of articles in the Washington Post is reprinted in full at 138 CONG. REC. S415-
421 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1992)).
At one time the National Broadcasting Co. (NBC) looked into producing a Cable News
channel to compete with CNN, which is partly owned by the cable industry. The cable sys-
tems, however, threatened not to carry NBC's news channel; this apparently convinced NBC
to scrap its plan to develop this program. Only after changing the format to a financial and
consumer news channel, which did not compete with CNN, was NBC able to get onto any
cable systems. 138 CONG. REC. S426 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1992) (statement of Senator Gore).
Similarly, TCI proved formidable when ESPN attempted to raise TCI's rates in 1984.
TCI threatened to drop the service, and ESPN backed down. Laura Landro, Tele-Communi-
cations Sets Cable- TV Agenda, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1986, at 6.
It became virtually impossible to air new programming without allowing cable to take a
significant equity position in it. For example, Home Box Office (HBO), which had never
before yielded equity to cable MSOs, announced its plan to start up a new comedy channel,
and publicly stated its intention to do so on its own without cable equity partners. In the
weeks immediately preceding the launch of its new comedy program, however, HBO appar-
ently realized that to succeed, it would have to allow cable MSOs to buy into the service in
order to obtain the degree of system penetration sufficient for the venture to survive. HBO
Said To Discuss Sale of Comedy Channel Stake, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1989, at B6. Landro,
supra, at B6.
40. The FCC found that "[h]ome satellite dish distributors are paying much higher rates
for superstation and network station programming than are other entities, such as cable system
operators." 138 CONG. REC. S425 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1992) (Senator Gore citing an FCC
report).
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ity to develop new programming, 4 was outweighed by the public interest
in jump-starting competition by breaking the bottleneck in the distribu-
tion of programming and giving competitors the ability to acquire pro-
gramming on fair and reasonable terms.4 2
Over five years of effort by would-be cable competitors to secure
more favorable access to cable programming networks is embodied in
sections 19 and 12 of the 1992 Cable Act.43
41. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 26-27, 33. Some have argued that it is a myth that
cable in fact took a risk and invested in the creation of programming. Media Ownership: Di-
versity and Concentration: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 277 (1989) (testi-
mony of Robert L. Schmidt, President, Wireless Cable Association). In addition, some take
issue with the claims that vertical integration results in increased programming. The propen-
sity of cable operators to favor programming services they own has frequently resulted in the
discontinuation of programming services that are popular with customers. Id. See also Com-
ments of Wireless Cable Association, Inc., at 92, 149 (filed Mar. 1, 1990) and Reply Comments
at 34 (filed Apr. 2, 1990) to Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's Policies
Relating to the Provision of Cable Television Service, Notice of Inquiry, MM Dkt. No. 89-600,
FCC 89-345 (Dec. 29, 1989) (the Comments and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking are on file
with the FCC).
42. Cable's own spectacular growth and success are attributable in significant part to leg-
islation-the cable compulsory license found in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 11 (d)-that
gave it an analogous form of access to programming. Section 111 (d) of this act establishes a
compulsory licensing program under which cable systems are permitted to make secondary
transmissions of broadcast signals carrying copyrighted works only after filing certain notices
and statements and paying certain fees. The cable compulsory license system was developed as
a means of accommodating two sometimes conflicting federal policies: ensuring the broad
dissemination of broadcast programs and protecting the rights of owners of copyrighted mater-
ials. 17 U.S.C. § 11 l(d) (1976). Congress recognized "that it would be impractical and unduly
burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work
was retransmitted by a cable system." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1976).
In the early 1970s, the cable industry was in the throes of battle with broadcasters over
the compulsory license. At that time, cable argued that access to programming at reasonable
rates was necessary for the fledgling cable industry to compete. Congress granted the cable
industry a compulsory license intending to assist this infant industry, by guaranteeing it access
to the programming it needed to attract subscribers. Media Ownership: Diversity and Concen-
tration, supra note 41. The compulsory licensing scheme gave cable operators the opportunity
to obtain broadcast programming at below market rates-a form of "access to programming"
somewhat analogous to § 19 of the 1992 Cable Act. Section 111 of the Copyright Act put
cable operators on footing equal or superior to the broadcast industry, thus providing consum-
ers with a wider choice and facilitating the rapid growth of the cable industry. 17 U.S.C.
§ 11 l(d) (1976). See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S588 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1992) (statement of Sena-
tor Hollings on S. 12).
43. Any analysis of these principal and most controversial sections of the new statute is
well-served by an appreciation of the full legislative context and long evolution of language
that reflects the give-and-take of a political process driven by powerful and often conflicting
forces. Initial efforts to provide access to programming grew out of bills addressing the myriad
of problems confronting the TVRO industry. See, e.g., S. 889, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133
CONG. REC. 6,7534 (1987) and accompanying S. REP. No. 272, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3
(1987) (summarizing earlier TVRO bills). By 1987, efforts began to broaden this concept to
provide access to cable programming for other technologies such as wireless cable. It appears
that the first such suggestion was made by Senator Kerry (D-MA) in his comments opposing
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Section 19 of the 1992 Cable Act amends Title VI of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934, creating prohibitions against restricting the availa-
an early access to programming bill. See id. at 24 (1987) (minority views). Ironically, Senator
Kerry also opposed the 1992 Cable Act. It was also in 1987 that Senator Pressler (D-SD) first
proposed that legislation not only prevent refusals to deal, but also prevent discriminatory
prices, terms, and conditions. Id. at 25. A litany of subsequent bills and hearings from both
the Senate and House make up an extensive legislative history. House Report, supra note 9.
See also S. 1880, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S15702 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1989) (The
Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1990, introduced by Senator Danforth (R-MO));
S. 211, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S544 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1991) (The Cable
Consumer Protection Act, introduced by Senator Lieberman (D-CT), prohibited local cable
companies from unreasonably discriminating among their subscribers, prohibited program-
ming distributors affiliated with cable operators from unreasonably refusing to deal with other
multichannel distributors of cable or from charging excessive prices or imposing other terms
on their programming that would impede retail competition.); S. 431, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
137 CONG. REC. S2011 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991) (The Competition in Cable Act of 1991, intro-
duced by Senator Metzenbaum (D-OH), provided that basic cable rates could be regulated in
the absence of effective competition, and prevented cable operators who offer multiple tiers of
basic service from forcing consumers to buy channels that they did not want in order to receive
those programming services they did want.); S. 432, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC.
S2011 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1991) (The Cable Television Subscriber Protection Act of 1991, also
introduced by Senator Metzenbaum, required vertically integrated cable programmers to offer
their programming to alternative technologies on fair terms and at nondiscriminatory prices,
and restricted horizontal concentration in the cable industry by forbidding any one cable com-
pany from providing service to more than 25% of cable subscribers in the country.); H.R. 550,
102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. H529 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1991) (This bill prohibited
local cable companies from unreasonably discriminating among their subscribers and prohib-
ited programming distributors affiliated with cable operators from unreasonably refusing to
deal with other multichannel distributors of cable and from imposing other terms on their
programming that would impede retail competition.); H.R. 1303, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137
CONG. REC. H1455 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1991) (This bill facilitated access to programming for
multichannel video providers by barring national and regional programmers affiliated with
cable operators from unreasonably refusing to deal with distributors in prices, terms, and con-
ditions of programming, and provided for cable rate regulation in the absence of effective com-
petition. This bill was introduced by Representative Markey (D-MA).); H.R. 3420, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. H6940 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1991) (This bill required program-
mers to establish nondiscriminatory prices, terms, and conditions for distribution of their pro-
gramming through third-party packages, required satellite television programmers who
encrypt their services to make those services available to home satellite antenna users, and
required programmers to establish reasonable and nondiscriminatory criteria for licensing sat-
ellite distributors.); H.R. 3560, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. E3415 (daily ed. Oct.
17, 1991) (This bill, introduced by Representative Eckart (D-OH), provided for fair access to
programming, encouraged multiple franchises, protected against horizontal concentration and
vertical integration, and provided for rate regulation.).
The first hearing focusing on the access to programming issue did not occur in a commit-
tee with formal jurisdiction over communications. Rather, Senator Metzenbaum, Chairman of
the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, convened a hearing and conducted a survey of anticompe-
titive practices of the cable industry. Competitive Issues in the Cable Television Industry:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) and 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The
Senator's year-long investigation into the issue led to the introduction of legislation that would
prohibit unreasonable discrimination in the sale of programming to multichannel video pro-
gramming distributors, restrict horizontal expansion, and redefine "effective competition"
HASTINGS COMM/ENT W.. [Vol. 15:305
THE 1992 CABLE AcT
bility of programming to cable competitors and related remedies." The
stated purposes of this new provision, section 628, are:
to promote the public interest, convenience, and necessity by increas-
ing competition and diversity in the multichannel video programming
market, to increase the availability of satellite cable programming and
satellite broadcast programming to persons in rural and other areas
not currently able to receive such programming, and to spur the devel-
opment of communications technologies.45
To accomplish these objectives, Congress adopted a sweeping general
prohibition in section 628(b) and gave directions to the FCC for imple-
menting the new ban, including four specific examples of prohibited
practices, in section 628(c).46
Section 628(b) makes it unlawful for any cable operator, "a satellite
cable programming vendor in which a cable operator has an attributable
interest," or a satellite broadcast programming vendor, including a super-
station distributor, to engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair
or deceptive acts or practices whose "purpose or effect" is to "hinder
significantly" or to "prevent" delivery of programming by multichannel
under the 1984 Cable Act. S. 834, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. 5,7006-9 (1989).
This legislation never passed but, in ensuing years, Senator Metzenbaum was one of the most
active and forceful advocates for increased competition in the cable industry.
Some of the other hearings related to access to programming include: Media Ownership.
Diversity and Concentration, supra note 41; Oversight of Cable TV. Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); The Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1989: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1990); Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1991: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Cable TV Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 1991: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Cable Television: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Cable Television Foreign Ownership: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Cable Copyright and Signal Carriage Act of 1982:
Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Cable Television Regulation:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
44. The prohibitions went into effect on December 4, 1992. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1,
§ 628. Enforcement of the prohibitions must necessarily await completion of the FCC
rulemaking related to implementation and remedies.
45. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 628(a) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 548).
46. Id. § 628(c)(2)(A)-(D).
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video programming distributors ("Multichannel Distributors" or
"MVPDs") 47 to subscribers.48
Section 628(c) requires the FCC to issue regulations that, at a mini-
mum, prohibit several anticompetitive practices. First, the regulations
must establish safeguards to prevent a cable operator that has an attribu-
table interest in a satellite cable programming vendor from unduly or
improperly influencing the decision of any such vendor to sell satellite
cable or broadcast programming, or from unduly influencing the price,
terms, and conditions of any such sale to an unaffiliated multichannel
distributor.49 Second, the FCC's new regulations must prohibit discrimi-
nation by a programmer in which a cable operator has an attributable
interest in the price, terms, and conditions of sales to unaffiliated mul-
tichannel distributors.5" Third, the regulations must prohibit arrange-
ments (including granting exclusive contracts) between a programmer
and a cable operator that prevent another multichannel distributor from
obtaining programming to serve areas not yet served by a cable operator
as of the date of enactment.51 Fourth, with respect to distribution in
areas that are served by a cable operator, the FCC must prohibit for ten
years exclusive contracts and similar arrangements unless such arrange-
ments are found by the FCC to be in the public interest. 52 These four
47. Id. § 628(a) (emphasis added). See supra note 24 for the 1992 Cable Act's definition
of "MVPD." Id. § 2(c)(6) (a multichannel distributor of subscription television that can po-
tentially offer competition to an established franchise cable distributor).
48. Id. § 648(b).
49. Id. § 628(c)(2)(A).
50. Id. § 628(c)(2)(B). Congress afforded four defenses available against alleged discrimi-
natory pricing. Section 628(c)(2)(B) does not bar:
(i) imposing reasonable requirements for creditworthiness, offering of service, and
financial stability, and standards regarding character and technical quality;
(ii) establishing different prices, terms, and conditions to take into account actual
and reasonable differences in the cost of creation, sale, delivery, or transmission of
satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming;
(iii) establishing different prices, terms, and conditions which take into account
economies of scale, cost savings, or other direct and legitimate economic benefits
reasonably attributable to the number of subscribers served by the distributor; or
(iv) entering into an exclusive contract [for an area served by a cable operator if such
contract is determined by the FCC to be in the public interest].
Id. § 628(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iv).
51. Id. § 628(c)(2)(C).
52. Id. § 628(c)(2)(D). In considering a request for approval of an exclusive agreement,
Congress has mandated that the FCC must consider:
(A) the effect of such exclusive contract[s] on the development of competition in
local and national multichannel video programming distribution markets;
(B) the effect of such exclusive contract[s] on competition from multichannel video
programming distribution technologies other than cable;
(C) the effect of such exclusive contract[s] on the attraction of capital investment in
the production and distribution of new satellite cable programming;
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specific prohibitions are Congressionally-mandated minimums. The
FCC is given the discretion to adopt rules that provide redress for any
conduct that is intended to or has the effect of hindering competition in
the subscription television marketplace under section 628(b).13
There remain, however, a myriad of details to be supplied by the
FCC that will determine how section 628 will be implemented in prac-
tice, and, more fundamentally, whether the Congressional objectives will
be achieved. The FCC's mandate was stated in the Conference Report:
[T]he Conferees expect the Commission to address and resolve the
problems of unreasonable cable industry practices, including restrict-
ing the availability of programming and charging discriminatory prices
to non-cable technologies. The conferees intend that the Commission
shall encourage arrangements which promote the development of new
technologies providing facilities-based competition to cable and ex-
tending programming to areas not served by cable. 54
The FCC's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" raises a large and, to some,
unnecessarily extensive range of issues. 56 Judging from the initial round
(D) the effect of such exclusive contract[s] on diversity of programming in the mul-
tichannel video programming distribution market; and
(E) the duration of the exclusive contract.
Id. § 628(c)(4). This restriction does not affect any contract granting exclusive distribution
rights that was entered into on or before June 1, 1990. However, it does affect an exclusive
contract entered into on or before June 1, 1990 that is renewed or extended after October 5,
1992. Id. § 628(h)(l)-(2).
This prohibition against exclusive contracts for satellite cable programming or satellite
broadcast programming between a cable operator and a satellite cable operator and a satellite
cable programming vendor in which a cable operator has an attributable interest will cease to
be effective on October 5, 2002, unless the FCC finds, in a proceeding conducted prior to the
end of that period, "that such prohibition continues to be necessary to preserve and protect
competition and diversity in the distribution of video programming." Id. § 628(c)(5).
53. Id. § 628(c)(1).
54. Conference Report, supra note 5, at 93.
55. Implementation of sections 12 and 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Program-
ming Distribution and Carriage, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, MM Dkt. No. 92-265, FCC
92-543 (Dec. 24, 1992) ("NPRM") (A summary of the NPRM can be found at 58 Fed. Reg.
328 (1993) but all references in this article will be to the NPRM on file with the FCC.).
56. See letter from Senators Hollings (D-SC), Inouye (D-HI), and Danforth (D-MO) to
Chairman Quello, MM Dkt. No. 92-259 (criticizing the NPRM for questioning Congressional
findings and reopening issues) (on file with the FCC). In many respects, the FCC's NPRM
appears to reopen issues debated and decided by Congress. For example, several commentors
argue that the FCC lacks authority to reopen the issue of the extent of influence that cable
MSOs have over affiliated programmers or whether unjustified differences in programming
prices harm competitors providing the same type of services. See NPRM, supra note 55, at
10 n.26, 12; see also comments of DirectTV, Inc. at 8 ("DirectTV") and National Rural
Telecommunications Cooperative and the Consumer Federation of America at 17 ("NRTC
and CFA") to NPRM, supra note 55. Furthermore, Congress already found that the types of
behavior enumerated in § 628(c) are inherently unfair practices that hinder competitors from
providing cable programming to subscribers. Arguably, the FCC may not demand evidence
that such behavior is also harmful to competitors. See NPRM, supra note 55, at 10;
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of comments, these issues will prove to be every bit as contentious as the
policy debate leading up to enactment.5 7
A. "Attributable Interest"
The most critical battle left by Congress to the FCC in the section
628 rulemaking may be over the definition of "attributable interest."'5 8
The section 628 restrictions are generally applicable to programmers in
which one or more cable operators have an "attributable interest." The
definition of this phrase will largely determine the coverage of section
628.
While not specifically proposing any given standard, the FCC's
NPRM asks for comments on whether the attribution threshold gener-
ally applicable to the broadcast industry should be adopted 59 and notes
DirectTV at I 1-12; Comments of the Wireless Cable Ass'n Int'l, Inc. at 36 ["WCA"]. Finally,
Congress already determined that there is no properly functioning marketplace for video pro-
gramming services, and therefore the FCC need not ask how its implementing regulations
under § 628 can rely on "marketplace forces" at this time. See NPRM at 12; see also com-
ments of DirectTV at 7 and WCA at 20.
57. The comments filed in response to an FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the
access to programming provisions illustrate the impact the FCC rulemaking process will have
on the scope and effectiveness of the 1992 Cable Act. The following is a partial list. (The
Comments are on file with the FCC (MM Dkt. No. 92-265).): Cablevision Industries Corp.,
Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., and Cox Cable Communications (joint filers); Conti-
nental Cablevision, Inc.; Landmark Communications, Inc.; Liberty Media Corp.; National
Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. ["NCTA"]; Tele-Communications, Inc. ["TCI"]; Time Warner
Entertainment Co., L.P. ["Time Warner"]; Viacom International, Inc. ["Viacom"]; Arts and
Entertainment Network; Discovery Communications; El Entertainment Television; Interna-
tional Family Entertainment, Inc.; Lifetime Television; Rainbow Programming Holdings, Inc.;
Superstar Connection; Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. ["TBS"]; Joint Comments of Bell
Atlantic and Pacific Bell Companies; National Rural Telecommunications Cooperative and
the Consumer Federation of America ["NRTC and CFA"]; National Telephone Cooperative
Ass'n ["NTCA"]; Nynex Telephone Companies; United States Telephone Ass'n; U.S. West
Communications, Inc.; Advanced Communications Corp.; Cable America Corp.; Coalition of
Small System Operators; Coalition of Concerned Wireless Cable Operators; Competitive Cable
Ass'n; Consumer Satellite Systems, Inc.; National Private Cable Ass'n, Maxtel Associates
Limited Partnership, MSE Cable Systems and Pacific Cablevision (joint filers); United States
Satellite Broadcasting Co.; Wireless Cable Ass'n Int'l, Inc. ["WCA"]; and Attorneys General
of Texas, Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
58. The Senate Report states that "[i]n determining what is an attributable interest, it is
the intent of the Committee that the FCC use the attribution criteria set forth in 47 C.F.R.
section 73.3555 (notes) or other criteria the FCC may deem appropriate." Senate Report,
supra note 8, at 78 (emphasis added). Before final passage, however, the House access provi-
sion, with amendments, was offered successfully by Congressman Tauzin (D-LA). The result-
ing House access provision does not define "attributable interest" in either the text or in the
accompanying legislative history. The Conference Report does not discuss "attributable
interest."
59. See Reexamination of the Commission's Rules and Policies Regarding the Attribution
of Ownership Interest in Broadcasting, Cable Television and Newspaper Entities, Report and
Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 997, 1004 (1984); or Memorandum Opinion and Order, I FCC Rcd. 802,
para. 1 (1986).
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that the five percent threshold for outstanding voting stock from the
broadcast attribution standard has been followed in the recent cable-telco
cross ownership proceeding.'
Not surprisingly, the record contains comments from the cable in-
dustry arguing for a high threshold test that would narrow the applica-
bility of section 628,61 while the noncable MVPDs from industries and
also consumer groups advocate lower thresholds that would make sec-
tion 628 more universally applicable.62
The clear intent of Congress in enacting section 628 was that pro-
gramming be made available to multichannel distributors who could
compete with the local cable franchisee. During the years Congress con-
sidered access to programming, it examined the role of vertical integra-
tion and the conduct of affiliates in restricting the ability of competitors
to obtain commercially viable programming packages.63 Ultimately,
60. See Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Second Report
and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
in CC Docket No. 87-266, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781, 5819 (1992).
61. For example, Continental Cablevision argues that the attributable interest standard
should exempt
those affiliations between cable operators and programmers in which a single person
or entity (other than the cable operator) has a 51% or greater voting share in the
programmer. The FCC rules should also exempt situations where the cable operator
holds limited partnership interests, non-voting stock, or other interest not deemed
attributable under the FCC's Broadcast Attribution Rules. In such cases, the cable
operator has no legal ability to exercise any control whatsoever over the
programmer.
Continental Cablevision, Inc., supra note 57, at 7. See also Viacom, supra note 57, at 4-9 (An
exception should be made for any vertically integrated programmer whose affiliated cable sys-
tems account for less than five percent of the programmer's total U.S. subscription base.); TCI,
supra note 57, at 10-12; and Time Warner, supra note 57, at 7-8.
62. The Wireless Cable Association argues in its comments that Congress did not intend
that only a controlling interest be deemed an "attributable interest," but rather "Congress was
concerned about the incentives and opportunities that a cable operator has to exercise undue
influence over the suppliers of video programming-incentives and opportunities that exist
even when the cable operator does not exercise actual control." WCA, supra note 57, at 24.
The FCC should find an attributable interest in a programmer or cable operator present when
a person is an officer or director or has the ability to designate an officer or director.. Finally, a
financial interest or element of ownership that affords the holder an opportunity to unduly
influence a programmer's conduct should also constitute "attributable interest." Id. at 22-28.
A sufficient financial interest or element of ownership is present where any party has a financial
interest in both entities, except for corporations with more than 50 shareholders. For such
corporations, only direct or indirect holdings of one percent or more are "attributable." Id. at
26 (citing Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, supra note 60, at
para. 36). See also DirectTV, supra note 56, at 12-14; NRTC and CTA, supra note 57, at 25-
27.
63. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. 7,9890-92 (1989) (statement of Senator Gore introducing S.
1068 and text of bill); 135 CONG. REC. E4102 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989) (statement of Repre-
sentative Cooper (D-TN) introducing H.R. 3826); 136 CONG. REC. H7249-66 (daily ed. Sept.
10, 1990) (discussion and text of H.R. 5267) and accompanying H.R. REP. No. 682, 101st
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however, Congress chose to move away from the concepts of formal ver-
tical integration through ownership and control toward a more flexible
concept of "attributable interest," in order to embrace the wide variety of
relationships in which cable MSOs are able to influence programmers."
In keeping with Congressional intent, the FCC should develop an
attributable interest standard that will have broad coverage, and that
does not permit the attributable interest threshold to become a significant
loophole.65 Even permitting just a few of the "crown jewels" of the most
popular programs to slip through can create a severe impediment to a
new entrant's ability to compete.66 Alternative multichannel distributors
must be able to provide their subscribers with a package of programming
comparable to the established cable operator.67
A vivid example driven home repeatedly throughout Congressional
hearings leading up to enactment of the 1992 Cable Act was the critical
importance of sports programming.6" Simply put, it is very difficult, if
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. REP. No. 381, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (Senate Report on S.
1880).
64. Significantly, the Community Antenna Television Association ("CATA") represent-
ing small and independent cable operators has maintained that the problems associated with
imposition of unfair terms and conditions on CATA members are not in any way linked with
vertical ownership. Reply Comments of CATA, at 4 (Feb. 16, 1993, MM Dkt. No. 92-265).
See WCA, supra note 57, at 24; DirectTV, supra note 56, at 13.
65. For example, the FCC's definition of attributable interest could encompass more than
actual financial or voting control over a programmer: "[N]on-voting or minority stockholders
may have significant influence over a programmer's contract decision even if they do not have
the ability to 'control' the programmer in the sense of voting on the day-to-day business deci-
sion of the company, particularly if they are also distributors of the programmer's product."
DirectTV, Inc., supra note 56, at 12. The goals of § 19 were established in light of Congres-
sional findings that the vertically integrated cable industry had the incentive and ability to
favor and influence affiliated cable operators and programming distributors. The five percent
broadcast attribution standard suggested by the FCC was created in a different context to
address concerns of "control," instead of the broader concern for the potential for undue influ-
ence. NRTC and CFA, supra note 57, at 24-25.
66. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Telco Entry Into Video, at 30 (unpublished paper presented
at the Annual Public Utilities Research Center Conferences, Gainesville, Fla., April 24, 1992);
Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 43, at 424, 436-37 (statement of Robert L. Schmidt, Presi-
dent, Wireless Cable Association).
67. Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 43, at 331, 333 (statement of Alfred C. Sikes, Chair-
man of FCC, on FCC Cable Television Policy, Recommendations and Initiatives: "Reason-
able access to programming is an essential ingredient to facilities-based competition in video
service."); NTIA Telecom 2000, supra note 16, at 491; Antitrust Subcommittee Survey, supra
note 15, at 5-7; Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's Policies Relating to the
Provision of Cable Television Service, Report, 5 FCC Rcd. 4962 (1990).
68. See generally Sports Programming and Cable Television: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Antitrust of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 14, 1989). See
also Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1989: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communi-
cations of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess.
(March 29, 1990) (statement of Joseph W. Hipple III, chief operating officer, People's Choice
TV); Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communi-
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not impossible, for a multichannel operator to attract subscribers unless
it is able to offer a significant complement of sports programming.69
Cable MSOs market accordingly and emphasize their exclusive sports
arrangements.70 Throughout consideration of the 1992 Cable Act, there
were vigorous efforts by opponents of access legislation to exclude sports
from section 628. One of the concerns voiced by proponents of the legis-
lation was that if the various loopholes that would have exempted several
sports channels had been adopted, it would have created a powerful
weapon for cable to forestall competition, notwithstanding the passage of
the 1992 Cable Act.71 Such loopholes, by creating added incentives to
move sporting events to exempted pay channels, could also tend to accel-
erate the migration of sporting events previously available free over the
air to pay cable channels.72
The definition of attributable interest also should be inclusive and
flexible enough to discourage attempts to escape the requirements of the
Act through manipulation of the formalities of the relationship between a
cable MSO and a programmer. More fundamentally, programmers
would actually benefit from selling to multiple distributors. 73 After all,
the ultimate relief under section 628 from the vantage point of the
programmer is that the programmer sell its product at fair market price
to additional buyers, who will in turn distribute the product to additional
subscribers. For these reasons, in fashioning the attributable interest
standard, the FCC would be well advised to risk erring on the side of
over-inclusiveness rather than under-inclusiveness.
B. The Interplay of the Broad Prohibition of Section 628(b), the Specific
Prohibitions of Section 628(c), and Antitrust Law
Another important issue the FCC will address is the operative rela-
tionship between the general prohibition against "unfair methods of com-
petition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices" contained in section
628(b) and the specific prohibitions against "undue or improper influ-
ence," "discrimination," and "exclusive contracts" contained in section
628(c).74 The FCC's NPRM inquires "whether Congress intended for
cations of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
280 (1991) (testimony of Robert L. Schmidt, President, Wireless Cable Association).
69. See, e.g., Sports Programming and Cable Television, supra note 68, at 4-7.
70. Id. at 6-7.
71. See Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 43, at 440-41 (testimony of Robert L. Schmidt).
72. The 1992 Cable Act requires the FCC to conduct an ongoing study of the migration of
sports programming, long a subject of Congressional concern, and to report back to Congress.
1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 26.
73. See Hazlett, supra note 66, at 33-35.
74. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, §§ 628(b)-(c) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 548).
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the Commission to regulate any additional 'unfair methods of competi-
tion or unfair or deceptive acts or practices' beyond those specified in
section 628(c)."75 In addition, the FCC inquires whether practices pre-
cluded under various antitrust laws are also encompassed within the sec-
tion 628 prohibitions and therefore warrant regulation by the
Commission.76 In the NPRM, the FCC also suggests adopting tradi-
tional antitrust principles at several points in its proposed rule."
The cable industry, seeking to limit the scope of the restrictions in
the access to programming provisions of the new law, argues that section
628(b) contains threshold requirements, such as the need to show
"harm" 78 in the relevant geographic markets, and that these require-
ments must be read into the regulations that the FCC must issue to im-
plement the specific prohibitions in section 628(c). 79 Although according
to the cable industry the 1992 Act does not reach practices that are ac-
tionable under antitrust law, the cable industry also asserts that the FCC
should adhere to various antitrust principles and standards in enforcing
the prohibitions of sections 628(b) and (c).8 0
The proponents of the access to programming legislation, including
noncable multichannel distributors, interpret the broad language of sec-
tion 628(b) as reaching practices beyond the specific and, in fact, per se
violations enumerated in section 628(c). I In stark contrast to the cable
industry, they view section 628(b) as expanding rather than limiting the
reach of the section. Moreover, the proponents of the legislation main-
75. NPRM, supra note 55, at 13 n.32.
76. Id. at 1 10 and 15.
77. Eg., id. at 1 10-11 (geographic market definition), 22 (Robinson-Patman Act stan-
dards to determine price discrimination).
78. Section 628(b) states that the "purpose or effect" of the prohibited conduct must be
"to hinder significantly or to prevent any multichannel video programming distributor from
providing satellite cable programming to consumers." Note that the plain language hardly
requires a demonstration of actual harm. A cause of action exists where a cable operator or
programmer has acted with the "purpose" of hindering potential competitors, even if the "ef-
fect" of such action fails to achieve its purpose. Congressional intent is expressed in § 628(b)
with deliberately broad language in order to end unreasonable cable industry practices. Sec-
tion 628(b) requires a threshold showing of "hindrance to competitors." The specific enumer-
ated prohibitions in § 628(c) identify behavior that is by definition unfair or hinders
competitors. Thus, for complaints under § 628(c) the FCC should not demand additional
evidence of harm to competitors. See DirectTV, supra note 56, at 10-12; NRTC and CFA,
supra note 57, at 13.
79. See TBS, supra note 57, at 9, 17; NCTA and CFA, supra note 57, at 7-9, 9-16; and
Viacom, supra note 57, at 10-12. The FCC raised this issue. See NPRM, supra note 55, at 11
10, 15, n.26.
80. See generally Liberty Media; NCTA and CFA; and TCI, supra note 57.
81. See NRTC, supra note 57, at 13-14; WCA, supra note 57, at 20-22; and DirectTV,
supra note 57, at 9-11. But cf. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 28 ("[T]he bill does not make
exclusive contracts per se illegal."). However, in conference the House access language, with
its tougher specific minimum prohibitions, was adopted in lieu of the Senate language.
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tain that the section 628 restrictions are in addition to and different from
the remedies that parties might seek under antitrust law.82
Section 628(b) contains an explicit statutory prohibition:
It shall be unlawful for a cable operator, a satellite cable programming
vendor in which a cable operator has an attributable interest, or a sat-
ellite broadcast programming vendor to engage in unfair methods of
competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices, the purpose or
effect of which is to hinder significantly or to prevent any multichannel
video programming distributor from providing satellite cable program-
ming or satellite broadcast programming to subscribers or
consumers. 83
Section 628(c) directs the Commission to adopt regulations to "specify
particular conduct that is prohibited by subsection (b)," giving as exam-
ples four specific practices that must be prohibited by such regulations.8 4
Section 628(b) is the heart of section 628, making unlawful any "un-
fair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices"-
whether enumerated in section 628(c) or not-if the FCC finds that the
purpose or effect of such methods, acts, or practices is to "hinder signifi-
cantly" or prevent any multichannel distributor from providing pro-
gramming to consumers. Thus, to state a claim for relief under section
628(b), a complaint needs to allege that a cable operator or covered
programmer is engaged in a practice that (1) is unfair or deceptive, and
(2) represents or is intended to be a significant hindrance to the provision
of programming service to consumers by a multichannel distributor. Ac-
cording to the authors of section 628(b), it was intended to cover refusals
to deal"5 as well as other discriminatory and exclusionary conduct be-
yond the specific minimum prohibitions in section 628(c). Consequently,
in issuing its section 628(c) regulations, the FCC should consider not
only specifying particular types of claims, but also should reiterate the
language of section 628(b) as a catch-all claim that it would recognize in
enforcement proceedings. Such a general provision would give the sec-
tion 628(c) regulations and resulting adjudications needed flexibility. In
sum, as a matter of textual analysis, legislative history, and policy, the
FCC should conclude that section 628(b) reaches conduct beyond the
section 628(c) enumerated minimums and expands rather than limits the
scope of section 628.
By enacting the Cable Act of 1992, Congress declined to accept the
vigorous arguments, advanced by the Bush Administration among
others, that fair access legislation was unnecessary because remedies
82. WCA, supra note 57, at 21-22; NRTC and CFA, supra note 57, at 14 n.6.
83. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 628(b).
84. Id. § 628(c)(1), (c)(2)(B)(i)-(iv).
85. See 138 CONG. REC. H6533-34 (daily ed. July 23, 1992) (remarks of Rep. Tauzin (D-
LA) (original author of proposed amendment ultimately incorporated as § 19)).
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under existing law provide competitors with sufficient recourse in the
courts to address anticompetitive conduct.8 6 While Congress explicitly
preserved antitrust remedies, 7 the legislative history is clear that the
FCC is to consider complaints that are also actionable under antitrust
laws. For example, the Senate Report explains:
The bill provides for an expedited administrative remedy for com-
plaints brought under section [628]. The goal of this provision is to
have programming disputes resolved quickly and without imposing
undue costs on the involved parties. Without such a remedy, start-up
companies, in effect, might be denied relief in light of the prohibitive
cost of pursuing an antitrust suit.
88
Indeed, the types of practices prohibited in sections 628(b) and (c),
including anticompetitive refusals to deal, price discrimination, and mo-
nopolization, have been illegal since the Sherman Antitrust Act s9 and the
Robinson-Patman Act,9" if not before under common law. It follows
that the 1992 Cable Act, if it is to make any sense as a matter of policy, is
intentionally designed to reduce the transaction costs and shift the bur-
den of proof to enhance the ability of cable competitors to obtain relief
from monopolistic conduct.9'
As a matter of policy, it also makes abundant sense not to infuse
section 628 with either the substantive or procedural mechanisms of anti-
trust litigation. Congress, having concluded that there was a compelling
need to promote competition, also concluded that it was impractical and
inefficient to rely on the courts to achieve that goal; the cost, time, and
86. See 138 CONG. REC. H6536 (daily ed. July 23, 1992) (remarks by Representative
Synar (D-OK) during floor debates prior to defeat of Representative Manton's (D-NY) substi-
tute bill supported by the White House, and passage of Representative Tauzin's access lan-
guage that, but for strengthening amendments in Conference, was ultimately enacted into
law.); Todd Buccholz, Associate Director of the Economic Policy Council, Remarks at the
Wireless Cable Convention in Orlando, Fla. (July 1992) (arguing that private remedies under
existing law were sufficient) (tapes of the convention are available from the Satellite Broadcast-
ing & Communication Association in Virginia). Ironically, this argument was advanced at the
same time Vice President Dan Quayle was sharply criticizing the litigiousness of American
business.
87. See 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 27 ("Nothing in this Act or the amendments
made by this Act shall be construed to alter or restrict in any manner the applicability of any
Federal or State antitrust law.").
88. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 28-29.
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1988). Arguably the Robinson-Patman Act does not apply
to sales of satellite-delivered programming services. See, e.g., Satellite Television & Assocs. v.
Continental Cablevision of Virginia, 586 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Va. 1982), afl'd, 714 F.2d 351 (4th
Cir.), and cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1983); H.R.M. Inc. v. Tele-Communications Inc., 653
F. Supp. 645 (D. Colo. 1987); Rankin County Cablevision v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply
District, 692 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Miss. 1988); TV Communications Network v. ESPN, 768 F.
Supp. 1062 (D. Colo. 1991).
91. The author acknowledges with appreciation University of California at Davis Profes-
sor Thomas A. Hazlett's insights on this point.
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uncertainty of litigation by market entrants against established compa-
nies with tremendously greater resources makes litigation a chimerical
option. It is simply not possible for entrepreneurs, who do not yet have a
revenue stream from an operational business and who typically cannot
obtain financing without providing lenders with signed copies of program
carriage agreements, to litigate their way into the market, channel by
channel.92
There is no indication that Congress intended, nor should the al-
ready overburdened FCC desire, to weigh down the administrative ma-
chinery for enforcing section 628 with the requirements of traditional
antitrust litigation. To the contrary, Congress chose to afford potential
competitors a forum in which to bring complaints based on unfair and
discriminatory practices, subject to penalties for bringing frivolous com-
plaints, and to receive a prompt determination whether the potential
competitors are entitled to relief. For this reason, it would be a serious
mistake for the FCC to fashion its section 628 regulations with antitrust
principles. To do so would unnecessarily increase the burden on both the
FCC and on the parties seeking relief, while jeopardizing the prospect
that section 628 would ever achieve its stated objectives.
C. Existing Agreements
The prohibitions of section 628 were effective sixty days after enact-
ment.93 The FCC NPRM, however, asserts that the 1992 Cable Act is
"silent" about enforcement of the antidiscrimination rules with respect to
existing contracts and tentatively concludes that section 628 should not
be applied "retroactively against existing contracts." 94 This position is
advocated by cable interests and opposed by the various non-cable mul-
tichannel distributors and consumer proponents of the legislation.95
Retroactivity and the need to "grandfather" existing contracts was a
highly charged issue considered at great length throughout the long legis-
92. Cable Television Regulation (Part I): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommu-
nications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1990) (testimony of Matthew Oristano, Chairman of People's Choice TV Partners).
93. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 28 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 325). This point was
recently driven home, for example, in the keynote speech by the Chief Counsel of the Senate
Communications Subcommittee, Antoinette Cook. Remarks Before the Tenth Annual Private
Cable Show (Nov. 11-12, 1992) (tapes of this convention speech are available from Satellite
Broadcasting & Communication Association in Virginia). For a summary of this speech see
Keynote speaker describes work in passage of 1992 Cable Act, PRIVATE CABLE, Jan. 1993, at 6,
22.
94. NPRM, supra note 55, at 27.
95. See, e.g., TBS, supra note 57, at 2-3; NCTA, supra note 57, at 34-37; NRTC and CFA,
supra note 57, at 32; and WCA, supra note 57, at 28-30.
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lative history of the 1992 Cable Act.96 Ultimately, the statutory lan-
guage enacted by Congress contains one, and only one, narrow
grandfather clause exempting a specific type of existing contract from the
requirements of section 628. Section 628(h) exempts exclusive contracts
entered into prior to June 1, 1990 only to the extent they apply to areas
served by a cable operator.97 This section further specifies that even in
the case of such a grandfathered contract, the exemption expires when
the contract is renewed or extended.9 8
In the face of this language and the legislative history, it is difficult
to find a compelling basis for declining to apply section 628 prospectively
to existing contracts. It is at best problematic whether enforcing section
628 would even require abrogating or revising an existing agreement be-
tween a programmer and a cable company in any instance other than
contractual exclusivity. For example, if a competitor is alleging discrimi-
natory pricing under section 628(c), the FCC can order relief for the
competitor, i.e., that it be sold programming at fair prices, without affect-
ing in any respect the contract terms the cable company has with the
same programmer. Programming agreements routinely allow the
programmer to change pricing on short notice. Programmers can there-
fore change their pricing to eliminate discrimination without breaching
their current agreements. 99 Such contracts typically also require the par-
ties to comply with applicable law, so the programmer should not be
liable for breaching an exclusive contract if exclusivity is illegal."°° To
deem all existing contracts exempted would be to seriously limit and de-
96. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 682, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1990); S. REP. No. 381, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1990); See also Senate Report, supra note 8, at 28. "The Committee does
not make any findings with regard to existing contracts or arrangements." Id. However, the
Senate access language was not adopted in Conference. See supra note 81.
97. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 628(h)(1). As this particular exemption was negoti-
ated during the legislative history, it was commonly referred to as the "TNT" exception.
Other exemptions and loopholes were also understood to affect specific entities and were de-
bated with this in mind. For example, the proposed so-called "regional sports" exception was
designed to limit the applicability of the access provision to national or multistate regional
services and arguably exempt regional sports. H.R. REP. No. 682, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 16,
105 (1990) (report on H.R. 5267); S. REP. No. 381, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 25, 63 (1990) (report
on S. 1880); Senate Report, supra note 8, at 27-28, 64; and House Report, supra note 9, at 110.
The vertical integration requirement of earlier bills' "attributable interest" threshold was simi-
larly known as the "ESPN exception." See 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 628(b) (definition
excluding independents such as ESPN); Senate Report, supra note 8, at 77. Taken together,
these three exceptions would have essentially exempted most sports programming from the fair
access provisions.
98. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 628(h)(2). TBS currently maintains that its
grandfathered exclusive contracts grant permanent exclusivity. TBS, supra note 57, at 8.
99. Reply Comments of Nat'l Satellite Programming Network, Inc., at 6 (on file with the
FCC, MM Dkt. No. 92-265).
100. Id.
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lay the impact of section 628 on stimulating competition. The way Con-
gress chose to limit section 628 was, in lieu of broad loopholes and
exemptions, to sunset the provision after ten years. 10 For these reasons,
the FCC should apply section 628 to existing contracts and construe nar-
rowly the grandfather clause for exclusive contracts covering areas actu-
ally served by cable.
D. Enforcement Procedures
Section 628(d) of the 1992 Cable Act provides that any multichan-
nel video programming distributor alleging conduct that violates sections
628(b) or (c) may commence an adjudicatory proceeding at the Commis-
sion.102 Section 628(0 requires the Commission to prescribe regulations
to implement this section, including provisions for expedited review by
the Commission, procedures for data collection, and provision for penal-
ties against any person filing a frivolous complaint.10 3
The FCC proposes adopting rules governing formal complaints that
would resolve disputes without a hearing unless there are substantial and
material issues of fact."c4 The FCC would require the complainant to
establish a prima facie case. If the threshold is met, the staff would hold
a status conference. Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") proceed-
ings would be possible. Discovery would be limited. 0 5
The most critical issues in determining the workability of these en-
forcement procedures will be the required elements of a prima facie case,
who bears the burden of proof at different points in the process, and the
thresholds for asserting a nonfrivolous complaint. The expedience of the
procedures will determine whether potential competitors, who heretofore
have not found the federal courts particularly hospitable, are encouraged
to seek relief at the FCC. The procedures adopted for enforcement of
sections 628(b) and (c) should be realistic in light of the environment in
which violations occur. An aggrieved party will have little information
available prior to filing a complaint with the FCC, for the party will not
be privy to negotiations and agreements between the programmers and
101. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 628(c)(5).
102. Id. § 628(d). Upon completion of the adjudicatory proceeding, the FCC is authorized
to order "appropriate remedies, including, if necessary, the power to establish prices, terms,
and conditions of sale of programming to the aggrieved multichannel video programming dis-
tributor." Id. § 628(e)(1). These remedies are "in addition to and not in lieu of the remedies
available . . . under any other provision of this Act." Id. § 628(e)(2).
103. Id. § 628(f)(l)-(3).
104. NPRM, supra note 55, at 38-45.
105. Id. at 45-48.
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cable operators.1"6 Accordingly, the threshold for a prima facie case
should be relatively low and, once satisfied, the burden should shift to the
responding party, who has access to the relevant information to establish
the defenses permitted under the statute.
Generally, thresholds for complaints under section 628(b) alleging
different types of misconduct will have to be established on a case-by-case
basis, because the practices that can constitute a violation of that section
are numerous and can evolve. Among other things, the FCC might well
require the section 628(b) complaints to offer evidence that the alleged
practice has the purpose or effect of hindering competitors. In contrast,
the FCC should recognize that Congress found the specific practices al-
ready enumerated in section 628(c) to be so unfair and damaging to com-
petition in the video marketplace that they are explicitly prohibited. The
FCC need not demand evidence that such section 628(c) behavior is
harmful to competitors-Congress has made this finding. I°7
In contrast to section 628(b), it is possible to discern with specificity
the appropriate elements of a prima facie case alleging violation of one of
the prohibitions enumerated in section 628(c). For example, to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination under section 628(c)(2)(B), a com-
plaint should show a reasonable basis for believing that the terms and
conditions proffered by a programmer in which a cable operator has an
attributable interest differ from those the same programmer offers any
other multichannel distributer. Such a showing should be sufficient to
shift the burden to the programmer to establish either that no such differ-
ence exists or that the difference is permissible under the specific excep-
tions provided for in sections 628(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iv). The complaining party
should not be required to establish that the discriminator caused harm
either to establish aprimafacie case or ultimately to prevail on the merits
and be entitled to relief.10 8
106. The FCC itself recognizes this problem, asking for example: "[H]ow will a multichan-
nel competitor establish the existence of an exclusive contract if it does not have access to the
contract? What if the contract is not written?" NPRM, supra note 55, at 133.
Obviously, if the statutory prohibition of exclusive contracts is to be enforced, it cannot be
that an MVPD must establish that an alleged violation is due to an exclusive contract which is
not in the public interest. Rather, the burden must be on the respondent to establish that a
refusal to deal is permissible, because it is a permissible exclusive contract in the public inter-
est, as determined by the five factors set forth in the statute. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1,
§ 628(c)(4)(A)-(E).
107. Cf. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 28 ("The Committee believes that exclusivity can
be a legitimate business strategy where there is effective competition. Where there is no effec-
tive competition, however, exclusive arrangements may tend to establish a barrier to entry and
inhibit the development of competition in the market."). Section 628 complaints will presuma-
bly involve markets where there is no effective competition.
108. In the NPRM, the FCC proposes to impose on an MVPD aggrieved by discrimina-
tory conduct violative of § 628(c)(2)(B) the burden of not only demonstrating that it has been
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Similarly, it should be sufficient to establish a prima facie case under
the anti-exclusivity provisions of sections 628(i)(2)(C) and (D) if a com-
plaint establishes that an MVPD requested a distribution agreement, but
the programmer refused. The burden should then shift to the program-
mer to demonstrate either that no exclusive agreement exists, or that the
refusal to deal is based on an agreement that is in the public interest. 9
Establishing such a prima facie case must also necessarily establish
that the case is nonfrivolous, whatever the ultimate outcome. The FCC
should not adopt a standard for "frivolous complaints" under section
628(0(3) that deters legitimate complaints or the prompt administrative
resolution of reasonable disputes. Complaints necessarily will be based
on simple affidavits from a multichannel distributor attesting to its rea-
sonable belief that, for example, discrimination has occurred, stating
facts required by the statute to establish a prima facie case. It will not be
known by the complaining party whether a defense exists to a reasonable
complaint until the programmer produces the relevant factual material
to establish a defense. A complaint should not be found to be "frivolous"
the victim of discriminatory treatment, but also that it has been prevented or significantly
hindered in providing programming to consumers as a result. See, e.g. NPRM, supra note 55,
at 10. Indeed, the FCC implies that an MVPD cannot seek redress for price discrimination if
the distributor carries the programming despite the higher price, and suggests that a complain-
ant may have to go so far as to demonstrate that the discrimination threatens the viability of its
service offering. Id. Simply put, there is absolutely nothing in § 628 or its legislative history to
suggest that Congress intended to limit the reach of its non-discrimination provisions in this
manner.
The Commission attempts to justify its proposal to require a specific showing of harm by
complainants under subsection (c) of § 628 by citing to the requirement under subsection (b)
that "the purpose or effect" of the conduct complained of must be "to hinder significantly or to
prevent" an MVPD from providing satellite cable programming to consumers. First, § 628(b)
itself does not even require a demonstration of actual harm; a cause of action exists where a
cable operator or programmer has taken action with the "purpose" of hindering an alternative
service provider, even if the "effect" of such action fails to achieve its purpose.
Second, Congress has already found that, unless justified under the factors specifically
enumerated in § 628(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iv), the imposition of discriminatory price, terms, and condi-
tions by a programmer in which a cable operator has an attributable interest is a per se viola-
tion of § 628. In effect, Congress has found that, unless justified by the specific considerations
it found relevant, discrimination has either the purpose or the effect of significantly hindering
the emergence of competition.
Parenthetically, there is similarly no basis whatsoever for the FCC's suggestion that some
minimum percentage of price differential would be deemed automatically acceptable, in effect a
"safe harbor" for price discrimination that does not exceed a certain level to be determined by
the FCC. Nowhere in the text of the statute or the entire legislative history of the Act or any
related bill was there ever a single mention of such a safe harbor for price discrimination. See
letter to Chairman Quello, supra note 56 (criticizing the NPRM for questioning Congressional
findings and reopening issues).
109. Arguably, the statute requires prior FCC approval of exclusive contracts. However,
at a minimum, if the FCC relies on the complaint process to address exclusive contracts, the
burden should shift to the parties to the contract to establish that the contract is in the public
interest.
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merely because the complainant does not prevail, particularly if the FCC
bases its decision on evidence that the complaining party did not know
existed until it was produced by the programmer in the administrative
proceeding.
Reasonably low thresholds for prima facie cases, minimizing discov-
ery, and shifting evidentiary burdens to respondents to establish affirma-
tive defenses are essential to assure multichannel distributors a relatively
swift, low cost, and effective administrative remedy as an alternative to
litigation. As the FCC has implied, ease of administration is relevant in
adopting these procedures.I 10 It is quite likely that the availability of a
relatively certain administrative remedy will have a powerful prophylac-
tic effect and will substantially reduce the case load before the
Commission. I I
E. Section 12, Program Carriage Agreements
Section 19 of the 1992 Cable Act, by creating section 628 of the
Communications Act of 1934, primarily restricts the activities of pro-
gramming vendors in which a cable operator has an attributable interest
from engaging in anticompetitive practices directed at other multichan-
nel distributors. In contrast, section 12 restricts the activities of cable
operators and other multichannel distributors directed at programming
vendors.
Section 12 of the 1992 Cable Act amends the Communications Act
of 1934 by adding new section 616, which requires the FCC to adopt
regulations that will prohibit a cable operator or other multichannel dis-
tributor from coercing a video programming vendor into providing ex-
clusivity against other multichannel video programming distributors as a
condition of carriage. 12 These section 616 restrictions apply whether or
not the programmer is vertically integrated and whether or not a cable
operator has an attributable interest in the programmer. Indeed, the leg-
islative record establishes the power of cable MSOs over so-called in-
dependent programmers as well as vertically integrated programmers. 13
Section 616 also directs the FCC to adopt rules to prevent a cable opera-
110. NPRM, supra note 55, at 33.
111. Similarly, it is likely that requiring prior approval for exclusive contracts could in
practice simplify the workload of the FCC in two ways. First, in light of the narrow grounds
in which exclusive contracts could be approved, applications for prior approval might well be
relatively few. Second, if the issue arises during the complaint process it may be disposed of
with alacrity, i.e., was the exclusive contract in question previously approved by the FCC, or
not? If so, the defense stands. If not, it fails.
112. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 616 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 536).
113. See, e.g., House Report, supra note 9, at 42-43; Senate Report, supra note 8, at 24-26.
See also supra note 40.
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tor or other multichannel distributor from acquiring a financial interest
in a program or service as a condition of carriage, or from discriminating
against an unaffiliated programmer in favor of an affiliated programmer
in selection, terms, or conditions of carriage.1 14
Consequently, even though exclusive contracts by so-called "in-
dependent" programmers such as ESPN and USA Network would not
automatically be banned by section 616, exclusive arrangements with
such "independents" can be attacked under section 616 if it can be
demonstrated that the exclusivity was coerced. Section 616 will be ex-
tremely important in determining whether competitors are able to assem-
ble a programming package that makes head-to-head competition
possible. Those rules could have an impact on the availability of pro-
gramming that falls outside the FCC section 628 attributable interest
standard, and could determine the extent to which parties are able to
avoid the full reach of the 1992 Act's fair access provisions by altering
their business relationships to escape whatever attributable interest stan-
dard the FCC adopts. Moreover, there is no sunset provision in section
12, so its prohibitions would survive and apply to all programming
should the ten-year sunset in section 628 go into effect in the year 2002.
II
Must Carry and Retransmission Consent
The so-called "Must Carry" and "Retransmission Consent" provi-
sions of the 1992 Cable Act came to be the most controversial parts of
the Act, involving the largest stakes, and mobilizing the largest lobbying
efforts on all sides of the issue in the final months leading to enactment.
These provisions govern the relationship between multichannel distribu-
tors, including cable operators, and the broadcast stations whose signals
the MVPDs retransmit to their subscribers. It is essential for any mul-
tichannel distributor who intends to deliver a broadcast signal into
homes to understand and comply with these complex provisions and to
keep abreast of the legal developments, including litigation, FCC
rulemakings, and new legislation that will affect the implementation of
Must Carry and Retransmission Consent.' 5
114. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 616 (a)(l)-(3).
115. Indeed, the constitutionality of the new Must Carry and Retransmission Consent pro-
visions was challenged in court on the very day of enactment. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, No. 92-2247 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 5, 1992). Also, the effective date of the new
provision is delayed 12 months until the FCC promulgates implementing regulations. The
103d Congress will take up copyright legislation based on H.R. 4511 from the last Congress
that is closely related and may affect retransmission consent. Two new Retransmission Con-
sent bills have already been introduced. See supra note 4.
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Under the 1992 Cable Act, broadcasters may either insist on car-
riage ("Must Carry") or bargain for carriage ("Retransmission Con-
sent"). The Must Carry language contained in sections 4116 and 5117 of
the 1992 Act gives local commercial and noncommercial television
broadcasters the right to mandatory carriage on "cable systems" as de-
fined for the purposes of the Communications Act of 1934,118 i.e., a tradi-
tional coaxial cable operator but not a wireless cable or DBS operator.
The Retransmission Consent language contained in section 6 of the 1992
Act prohibits cable operators and other multichannel distributors from
carrying the signals of television stations without first obtaining the
broadcaster's consent. I"' The provisions are interrelated because once
effective, broadcasters on a system-by-system basis must opt every three
years between the Must Carry and Retransmission Consent regulatory
regimes. If Must Carry is selected, then local cable systems are required
to retransmit their signal (at no cost to either party). If Retransmission
Consent is selected, or if the multichannel distributor is not subject to
Must Carry, then the right to retransmit is governed by a negotiated
agreement between the broadcaster and the multichannel distributor. 2 '
It was only relatively late in the process that the proponents of Must
Carry and Retransmission Consent attempted to add language to the ma-
jor cable vehicles moving through Congress.' 2' These provisions, how-
ever, had a long evolution, wholly independent of the consumer- and
116. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 4 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 534). This section
amends the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 325) by adding § 614.
117. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 5 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 535). This section
amends the Communications Act of 1934 by adding § 615.
118. See Definition of a Cable Television System, Report and Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 7638,
7635-41 (1990), revised on other grounds sub. nom. Beach Communications v. FCC, 965 F.2d
1103 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. granted, U.S.L.W. (Nov. 30, 1992) (No. 92-603). Note that there
is a different, more expansive definition of a cable system in § 111 of the Copyright Act of 1976
that governs the coverage of the cable compulsory license.
119. The 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 6 amends § 325 of the Communications Act of
1934 (47 U.S.C. § 325). The language of § 6 gives a broadcaster the right to invoke must carry
against cable operators while electing retransmission consent for other MVPDs. Id.
§ 325(b)(5).
120. The required FCC regulations to implement these provisions are scheduled to go into
effect October 4, 1993. Id. § 325(b)(1). There are several statutory exceptions to Retransmis-
sion Consent. It does not apply to: (1) noncommercial broadcast stations; (2) retransmission
directly to home satellite antennae of certain broadcast signals; and (3) certain retransmissions
of superstations. Id. § 6(A) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 325 (b)(2)(A)-(D)).
121. Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI), Chair of the Senate Communications Subcommittee,
added a retransmission consent provision to the amended version of S. 12 during the full com-
mittee mark up of the bill, which was favorably reported out of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 28, 1991. H.R. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1992). See also 138 CONG. REC. S400-408 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1992) (first day of consid-
eration of S. 12). The House did not vote on Retransmission Consent until it approved the
Conference Report. 138 CONG. REC. H8671 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1992).
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competitor-driven momentum that challenged the monopoly power of
the unregulated cable industry.122
A. Evolution
Cable retransmission began to come to a head as a copyright issue in
1965.123 In hearings before a House Judiciary Subcommittee, broadcast-
ers argued for full copyright liability for cable retransmission of broad-
cast signals.1 24 Around the same time, the FCC initiated its role as the
regulator of cable television by implementing the first Must Carry
rules.125 These rules required cable system operators to transmit to their
subscribers, upon request and without compensation, each and every
over-the-air broadcast signal that was "significantly viewed in the com-
munity" or otherwise considered local by the FCC. 12 6
As the copyright debate continued in Congress, the Supreme Court
handed down two important cases impacting the retransmission issue.
The first case established the FCC's authority over the cable industry. 127
In the second case, the Supreme Court held that cable retransmission of
local broadcast signals was wholly outside the copyright laws.' 28 In
1974, the Supreme Court held that cable systems were not liable under
copyright laws for retransmitting either distant or imported signals. 29
This, along with the Fortnightly decision, made the absolution of copy-
right liability for cable retransmission complete.
122. For example, the Must Carry provisions of the 1992 Act reinstitute a version of the
FCC's mandatory carriage rules that applied from 1965-1985, but were invalidated by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). See also Century Communications Corp. v.
FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), revised, 837 F.2d 517, and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1032
(1988). Subsequently, the FCC opened another Must Carry inquiry, which, in light of the
Cable Act of 1992, it has terminated. See Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 6
FCC Rcd. 4545, 4564 para. 99 (1991).
123. See The Cable and Satellite Carrier Compulsory Licenses: An Overview and Analysis,
A Report of the United States Register of Copyrights, at 7 (March 1992) ("Copyright Office
Report").
124. Id.
125. Second Report and Order in Docket 14895, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966); First Report and
Order in Docket 14895, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965). See also Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v.
FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 95 (1963), which upheld 32 F.C.C.
459 (1966), requiring cable systems to carry local broadcast signals as a condition for granting
a microwave license to a rural cable system.
126. Second Report and Order in Docket 14895, 2 F.C.C.2d at 746.
127. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
128. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artist Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, reh'g denied, 393
U.S. 902 (1968).
129. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). See
also Copyright Office Report, supra note 123, at 22-23.
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Finally in 1976, Congress took matters into its own hands by
amending the 1909 Copyright Act and establishing a licensing system for
cable retransmission. 130 The thrust of the new licensing scheme, called
compulsory licensing, was to guarantee cable operators the right to con-
duct their business free from the threat of liability as long as they com-
plied with FCC regulations and paid their proper royalties.13 1  Cable
systems were allowed to carry local signals at no charge, but had to pay
royalties for retransmitting distant signals. The statutory compulsory li-
censing system attempted to balance the competing interests of copyright
holders with those of the cable operators, or any other operator retrans-
mitting their work, by allowing them to retransmit works from broad-
casters without having to negotiate with the copyright holder of each
work. 132
The courts again complicated the ongoing debate when the D.C.
Circuit Court held that Must Carry rules violated cable operators' First
Amendment rights. 33 Although the court ruled that the existing Must
Carry rules were unconstitutional, it did not hold that Must Carry was
per se unconstitutional. Thereafter, the FCC attempted to refashion the
Must Carry rules,"' but the D.C. Circuit Court again struck them down
as unconstitutional. 13
The Must Carry provision of the 1992 Cable Act is the first legisla-
tive attempt since the Century Communications case to construct a set of
Must Carry rules that can survive judicial scrutiny. At the urging of the
broadcasters, Senator Inouye first introduced a bill that included Must
130. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 11 and 119 (1976 and Supp. 1992) (Cable sys-
tems are permitted to make secondary transmissions of copyrighted works contingent on the
filing of certain notices and statements and the payment of certain fees. The program was
developed as a means of accommodating two sometimes conflicting federal policies: ensuring
the broad public dissemination of broadcast programs, while at the same time protecting the
rights of owners of copyrighted materials.)
131. Copyright Office Report, supra note 123, at 24.
132. Id. at 23-24.
133. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1169 (1986).
134. These scaled-back Must Carry rules limited the number of broadcast stations a cable
system was required to carry, established a minimum viewership standard for stations to be
eligible for carriage, permitted cable systems to refuse carriage of more than one broadcast
station affiliated with the same commercial broadcast network, and limited the number of
noncommercial stations a cable system was required to carry. The rules were to remain in
effect for only five years and then be eliminated entirely. Amendment of Part 76 of the Com-
mission Rules Concerning Carriage of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Sys-
tems, Report and Order, I FCC Red. 864, 889 (1986).
135. Century Communications v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 486 U.S.
1032 (1987). The court concluded that the FCC had not demonstrated a substantial govern-
mental interest in some aspects of the rules to satisfy First Amendment requirements and that,
in any event, the rules were overly broad.
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Carry and Retransmission Consent in 1990,136 but he made it clear that
this was not to be taken at that time as an indication of his endorsement
of the proposal.'37
Meanwhile, in the House, the principal opponents of Retransmis-
sion Consent, including the National Cable Television Association and
various Hollywood interests spearheaded by the Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America, had a major impact. A jurisdictional dispute erupted
between the House Energy and Commerce Committee, where the cable
legislation originated, and the House Judiciary Committee, which in-
sisted on referral of any cable bill containing Retransmission Consent
language. In the view of the Judiciary Committee leadership, Retrans-
mission Consent implicated the Judiciary Committee's jurisdiction over
copyright matters. The Committee was, and still is, considering what it
viewed as related legislation to revise the cable compulsory license. 138 In
all likelihood, referral to the House Judiciary Committee of the House
cable bill would have killed the chances of passing cable legislation in the
102d Congress, and certainly would have eliminated the possibility of
Retransmission Consent becoming law.139 In a tactical maneuver, the
Energy and Commerce Committee reported a substitute bill," H.R.
4850,141 passed by the full House, that contained only Must Carry but
not Retransmission Consent language.
The tactical gamble was that Retransmission Consent, which had
been stripped from the House bill, would be added back in Conference by
the Senate where support for the proposal was stronger. The proponents
of Retransmission Consent assumed that, without a negative vote in the
House in either Committee or on the floor, the House Conferees chosen
from the Energy and Commerce Committee would be able to agree to the
Senate Amendment to add Retransmission Consent to the legislation. In
effect, the sponsors of the House Cable bill were willing to delay the fight
136. See 136 CONG. REC. S3405 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1990) (statement of Senator Inouye,
text of S. 2357, section-by-section analysis of this bill, and letter from National Association of
Broadcasters to Senator Inouye regarding this legislation). No action was taken on S. 2357
and it died in the 101st Congress.
137. Under S. 2357 cable operators would have been given the option of not carrying local
commercial broadcast signals, but if they elected to engage in such carriage, they would have
to comply with the fee payments and must carry provisions of the bill. Cable systems would
have had to submit a retransmission fee to the FCC, which would annually distribute the fees
to broadcasters, networks, and copyright holders. Id.
138. H.R. 4511, The Copyright Broadcast Retransmission Licensing Act of 1992, 138 CONG.
REC. H1379 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1992) (would amend 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119).
139. See Randall M. Sukow, House Pushes Cable License Reform, BROADCASTING, Nov.
18, 1991, at 59.
140. House Report, supra note 9.
141. H.R. 4850, Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 138
CONG. REC. H6523 (daily ed. July 23, 1992).
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over Retransmission Consent until the full House would take up the
Conference Report, and, in effect, force a vote on whether or not Con-
gress was to have any cable legislation enacted before the November 1992
elections. The tactic worked. In Conference, the Senate and House Con-
ferees adopted the Senate Retransmission Consent provision,142 which
finally passed when both the Senate and the House approved the Confer-
ence Report.143
B. The Interplay Between Retransmission Consent and the Cable
Compulsory License
For multichannel distributors subject to Retransmission Consent,
section 6 of the 1992 Cable Act only affects the relationship between the
multichannel distributor and the broadcast station whose signal the
MVPD negotiates to transmit. This new provision does not affect the
multichannel distributor's relationship with the copyright holders in the
programming, which is governed instead by the cable compulsory
license.
The 1992 Cable Act expressly provides that Retransmission Consent
is not to be construed as modifying the compulsory license.'" As the
Conference Report explains, multichannel distributors carrying the sig-
nals of broadcast stations, whether pursuant to Must Carry or to Re-
transmission Consent, will continue to have the authority to retransmit
the programs carried on those signals under the section 111 compulsory
license of the Copyright Act of 1976.145 Nor does the 1992 Cable Act
affect existing or future program licensing agreements between broad-
casters and program suppliers. 146 This means that broadcasters do not
have to obtain the consent of copyright holders before authorizing mul-
tichannel distributors to retransmit their signals. 14 7
Nevertheless, both the Conference Report and the Senate Report
acknowledge that enactment of Retransmission Consent "may change
the environment in which the compulsory copyright operates."' 48 This,
it would seem, is an artful understatement. During the time section 6 of
the 1992 Cable Act was considered, and to this day, many players, in-
142. Conference Report, supra note 5, at 76.
143. See supra note 5.
144. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(6) (1993).
145. Conference Report, supra note 5, at 76; Senate Report, supra note 8, at 36.
146. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(6); Conference Report, supra note 5, at 46-47; Senate Report,
supra note 8, at 76.
147. But cf Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi-
tion Act of 1992, Broadcast Signal Carriage Issues, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, MM Dkt.
No. 92-259, FCC 92-499 (Nov. 19, 1992), at 65 ("Retransmission/Must Carry NPRM").
148. Conference Report, supra note 5, at 76. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 37 and n.86.
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cluding the U.S. Register of Copyrights, viewed the two concepts as ut-
terly incompatible.1 49 Others contend that, at a minimum, both were
inextricably interrelated, 50 and the comprehensive revision of the cable
compulsory license system underway in Congress cannot progress with-
out regard to rules for Retransmission Consent. 5 ' For example, if Con-
gress acts to phase out or to substantially revamp the cable compulsory
license, copyright rates for multichannel distributors would most likely
be negotiated with the copyright holders in a free market or through
some clearinghouse mechanism. In that case, the distributors would
have to negotiate twice for the same signal under two different statutes:
first, with the broadcaster for the right to carry the signal under section 6
of the 1992 Cable Act, and second, with the copyright holders for the
right to distribute their creative works. 52 In other words, Congress
should not act to replace the current compulsory license without looking
at the overall context of all the transactions and costs the multichannel
distributors would face in order to deliver their signals to their
customers.
At another, more basic level, when the retransmission consent/
copyright debate is stripped of its legalisms and rhetoric, it begins to re-
semble a naked struggle between different industries over the apportion-
ment of subscription television's huge revenue pie. Copyright holders,
represented in Washington by the Motion Picture Association of
America and others, seek larger copyright royalties from cable and other
multichannel operators than they are presently paid under the existing
compulsory license system. They also seek a portion of what a broad-
caster might be able to charge a multichannel distributor for retransmit-
ting a copyrighted work. In the view of the Motion Picture Association
of America, subscribers do not turn to a broadcast signal because the
network transmits a "lovely" signal, but rather because they wish to view
the creative work carried by the signal. 153 Broadcasters, in contrast, seek
149. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 123, at 156.
150. See 138 CONG. REC. H6505 (daily ed. July 23, 1992) (remarks of Rep. Hughes)
("Make no mistake, retransmission consent is nothing more than a copyright in sheep's cloth-
ing of the communications statute. The U.S. Copyright Office has agreed, stating that retrans-
mission alters the fundamental principle of the compulsory licensing scheme.").
151. See H.R. 4511, The Copyright Broadcast Retransmission Licensing Act of 1992, supra
note 138 (introduced in the 102d Congress by Representative Hughes (D-NJ), who chairs the
House Judiciary Intellectual Property Subcommittee). A version of this bill is expected to be
reintroduced in the 103d Congress.
152. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1991: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of Charles C. Hewitt, President, Satellite
and Communications Association).
153. Hearing on HR. 4511, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and
Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (Apr. 1,
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compensation for the added value they contribute to assembling and re-
transmitting their programming. Broadcasters complain that cable has
built its success by using broadcast programming without paying for it.
They also resist yielding to the copyright holders a portion of the revenue
they feel they are entitled to for retransmission of their broadcast signal.
The multichannel distributors, including cable, quite naturally seek to
minimize the payments they must make to either the copyright holders
or the broadcasters. In the end, perhaps the central reason for the con-
tentiousness surrounding the subject matter is that it is all about
money-a very large amount of money.'54 It is, therefore, virtually a
certainty that the courts and Congress will continue to revisit the issue.
C. Litigation and Future Legislation: Prospects
The Must Carry and Retransmission Consent provisions of the 1992
Cable Act have the greatest likelihood of being significantly impacted by
either subsequent litigation or legislation. A suit filed by Turner Broad-
casting within hours of enactment and soon joined by several other par-
ties"'55 attacks Must Carry as a violation of the cable operators' First
Amendment right of free speech and alleges that Must Carry is, in fact,
more expansive than the FCC's Must Carry rules invalidated by the
court in Quincy'5 6 and Century.'57 In addition, TBS essentially argues
that Retransmission Consent is unconstitutional because it cannot be sev-
ered from the Must Carry provisions of the Act. 58
1992) (statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America)
(forthcoming).
154. Billions are at stake. Total cable revenue for 1992 was estimated at $19 billion. See
Anthony Ramirez, Ameritech Offers to End Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1993, at D3.
Under the cable compulsory license, cable operators have paid more than $1.1 billion in royal-
ties over the past 13 years and over $150 million in each of the last 5 years. Harry Jessell,
Congress' Compulsory License Cauldron, BROADCASTING, Nov. 11, 1991, at 56. CBS alone
claims that retransmission consent fees would generate at least $72 million in additional reve-
nues for CBS and its affiliates. COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, June 4, 1991, at 8.
155. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, No. 92-2247 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 1992). In its
amended complaint, filed Nov. 5, 1992, Turner Broadcasting ("TBS") was joined as plaintiff
by several other owners of cable program networks: Arts & Entertainment Network, Black
Entertainment Television, E! Entertainment Television, Hearst/ABC-Viacom Entertainment
Services, International Family Entertainment, National Cable Satellite Corp., QVC Network,
The Travel Channel, and USA Networks.
156. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1169 (1986).
157. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), revised, 837
F.2d 517, and cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
158. The case is currently before a district court of three judges with a right of direct
appeal to the Supreme Court as required by § 23 of the 1992 Cable Act (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 555(c)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2285). All of the pending cases challenging various provi-
sions of the 1992 Cable Act were consolidated before the three judge court (Williams, J., Pre-
siding, Sporkin, J., and Jackson, J.) (Oct. 13, 1992). Pursuant to § 23, the three judge court
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It would seem that TBS has a reasonable prospect of prevailing on
its Must Carry challenge, if based on nothing else but that such rules
have twice previously been thrown out by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia."3 9 This problem was certainly an-
ticipated in both the Senate and the House where the respective Commit-
tee Reports took great pains to argue the constitutionality of the new
Must Carry provisions."
The attack on Retransmission Consent would appear to be on
weaker footing. First, even allowing for the procedural delays in hearing
the case,161 TBS is asking the court to decide its challenge before the
FCC concludes its section 6 rulemaking. In effect, TBS is asking the
court to conclude that no Retransmission Consent regulations that the
FCC could issue would be constitutional. In addition, even if Must
Carry fails, it is obviously possible for Retransmission Consent to oper-
ate. This is apparent because some multichannel distributors such as
wireless cable operators are not, by definition, subject to Must Carry. 6 2
A local broadcaster cannot force a wireless cable operator to retransmit
its signal over its wireless cable channels. However, all wireless cable
operators will have to obtain Retransmission Consent under section 6.
Therefore, the statutory framework itself contemplates that Retransmis-
sion Consent can operate with or without Must Carry.
subsequently retained jurisdiction along with TBS of all of the claims in the consolidated cases
challenging the Must Carry provisions of §§ 4 and 5 of the Act, and to the extent related,
Retransmission Consent in § 6 (Nov. 13, 1992). All other claims have been assigned to Judge
Jackson who will hear argument on cross-motions for summary judgment filed February 12,
1993. In this later proceeding, a serious question of ripeness arises because the challenges
presage the completion of the FCC's various rulemakings. Judge Jackson has denied plaintiff's
request for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in part based on the absence of imple-
menting regulations and the speculative nature of injury (Order Jan. 22, 1993). Whether or not
dismissed for lack of ripeness, it is expected that the issues will be relitigated when the inevita-
ble appeals are filed challenging the FCC's upcoming rules.
159. Quincy Cable TV, 768 F.2d at 1434; Century Communications, 835 F.2d at 292.
160. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 53-62; House Report, supra note 9, at 58-74.
161. The briefing schedule and oral argument were delayed, for example, because the Jus-
tice Department under the outgoing Bush Administration initially indicated that it would not
defend against the Must Carry challenges. The basis for this position was presumably that the
Department had advised the President to veto the legislation because it concluded that the
Must Carry provision was unconstitutional. Upon the motion of several parties, and with
Congress itself procedurally unable to defend the statute until it reconvened and could for-
mally approve such participation in the litigation, the court postponed hearing the merits of
the case. Under the Clinton Administration, the Justice Department has reversed its position
and has filed a brief defending Must Carry. The day before the Justice Department entered
this case, the Senate passed a resolution to file an amicus curiae brief in defense of Must Carry.
139 CONG. REC. S1145-47 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993).
162. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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Whatever the outcome in court, Retransmission Consent will be a
subject of Congressional scrutiny once again in the 103d Congress. 163
All the parties involved in the court challenges and the FCC rulemakings
will have an opportunity and can be expected to continue to pursue this
issue vigorously in the legislative venue as well.
D. Retransmission Exclusivity-The Trojan Horse
Although the focus of section 6 is the relationship between broad-
cast stations and multichannel distributors and not the problems associ-
ated with the power of cable MSOs and unregulated cable monopolies at
the local level, section 6 should be implemented in a manner that ad-
vances and does not impede competition-one of the principal goals of
the 1992 Cable Act. Specifically, the FCC should guard against cable
operators extracting exclusive retransmission consent agreements from
local broadcasters or requiring local broadcasters to discriminate against
emerging competitors on the basis of price or any other terms or condi-
tions governing retransmission. This possibility arises because section 6
of the 1992 Cable Act does not explicitly prevent a broadcaster from
granting retransmission consent on an exclusive basis, nor does it pro-
hibit a cable operator from coercing a broadcaster into such an arrange-
ment. This omission might create a loophole that would encourage
conduct comparable under section 6 in its nature and effect to the prac-
tices barred by the fair access provisions and carriage requirements of
section 19 and section 12 of the Act. The possibility of exclusive retrans-
mission consent is the trojan horse of the 1992 Cable Act, posing the
single most serious threat to the success of the legislation in fostering
competitive multichannel operators nationwide.1"
Until enactment of the 1992 Cable Act the availability of popular
broadcast programming to alternative multichannel distributors was not
a concern. Those multichannel distributors who engaged in retransmis-
sion of broadcast signals could do so freely without interference from the
163. See supra notes 4 and 151.
164. See letter from Representative Boucher (D-VA) to Chairman Quello, MM Dkt. No.
92-259 (expressing concern over the possibility of retransmission exclusivity and urging a 10-
year ban on exclusivity) (on file with the FCC). A further indication that this concern is more
than idle speculation is the vigorous opposition of at least one major cable operator to the
efforts of some local officials to pass legislation that would close the retransmission consent
loophole and bar exclusive broadcast carriage agreements. Bill 26-92, Cable Communica-
tions-Increased Competition, sponsored by Councilmember Michael Subin, Montgomery
County Council, Maryland, and Legislative Analysis prepared by E. Beninger, Feb. 1, 1993, at
3 ("Should prohibition on exclusive retransmission agreements be added to bill, recommending
amendment.").
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cable industry. 165 Unfortunately, cable operators now have the incentive
and opportunity under section 6 to repeat the behavior they previously
exhibited with nonbroadcast programmers by attempting to extract ex-
clusivity or discriminatory provisions in retransmission consent agree-
ments with local broadcasters.
Many broadcasters are particularly vulnerable to cable's market
power. Cable operators have the market power to extract considerations
from even the strongest television stations that could not be gained in an
effectively competitive marketplace. 166 If tolerated by the FCC, cable
operators could be expected to negotiate for the exclusive right to carry a
local broadcaster and, in the absence of price competition, could pass
along to the consumer the cost of acquiring exclusivity by raising the
rates for basic service. Cable operators could also penalize broadcasters
who opt for retransmission consent and who deal with competitive
technologies. 167
Whatever else can be said about the Congressional intent underlying
this landmark legislation, it is certain that Congress intended to stimulate
competition and that it did not intend to create new obstacles for emerg-
ing competitors such as wireless cable, TVRO, and DBS. If unchecked,
cable's incentive and ability to pressure broadcasters who make their sig-
nal available to competing technologies could completely derail the ef-
forts of Congress and the FCC to generate competition and diversity in
the marketplace. Local broadcast signals represent roughly two-thirds of
the viewing time on the average cable system. Consumers expect that
their local multichannel video programming distributor will provide ac-
cess to local broadcast signals and, indeed, no cable or other multichan-
nel distributor could succeed without them. 168 Because of the popularity
165. The 1992 Act does not affect situations where retransmission is not involved, i.e., no
consent is required where the local broadcast signals are received off the air on a standard
UHF/VHF antenna. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 26.
166. Id. at 45.
167. Cable operators might, for example, (1) refuse carriage to uncooperative broadcasters;
(2) reposition broadcasters to channels that cannot be received on many television sets without
special converters leased at extra cost from the cable system; (3) program converter boxes so
that they automatically display a channel other than the broadcaster's when first turned on;
and (4) bias the ratings of uncooperative broadcasters through manipulation of knowledge as
to which subscribers are metered. See WCA, supra note 57, at 23 (prepared by Paul J. Sinder-
brand and Dawn G. Alexander).
168. Cable subscribers spend the majority of their time watching broadcast programming.
James Hedlund, President of the Association of Independent Television Stations, Inc., has
stated that "free off-air broadcasting accounts for 74% of the audience share points in cable
households [and that] Independent Television alone receives a 21% prime time audience share
in cable households." Cable Television Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecom-
munications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
182 (1990) (statement of James B. Hedlund, President, Association of Independent Television
Stations, Inc.) (emphasis omitted).
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of the local broadcast stations, consumers simply will not subscribe to
the multichannel programming distribution services that cannot deliver
the same local broadcast signals as cable.169
Section 6 requires the Commission to consider when implementing
rules "the impact that the grant of retransmission consent by television
stations may have on the rates for the basic service tier and shall ensure
that the regulations prescribed under this subsection do not conflict with
the Commission's obligations under section 623(b)(1) to ensure that the
rates for the basic service tier are reasonable." 170 The price benefits to
consumers of competition can not develop unless the Commission pro-
tects the ability of nascent competitors to negotiate retransmission con-
sent agreements. This is because, in order to compete effectively, cable
system competitors must be able to provide their subscribers with a chan-
nel lineup similar to that of cable system operators-this includes both
broadcast programs and non-broadcast programs.
For this reason the FCC could, for example, ban cable operators
from either securing exclusive retransmission agreements with broadcast-
ers or including in retransmission agreements provisions that would re-
quire the broadcaster to discriminate against emerging competitors with
respect to price or any other terms or conditions governing
retransmission. 171
According to the press release announcing the FCC's completion of
its Retransmission Consent rulemaking, the FCC has, in fact, decided to
bar retransmission consent exclusivity, and to reexamine the issue in
three years.172 At this writing the official report and order have not yet
been issued, and it is not possible to discern the basis for the FCC's im-
portant decision. In taking this action, the FCC, however, apparently
has declined to invoke its authority under section 325(b) concerning the
impact of that section on basic rates. Rather, the Commission indicates
that it will address this issue pursuant to section 623(h)(3) and its rate
regulation proceeding.173 Should the FCC be asked to reconsider its ban
169. A survey conducted for NAB and NTA found that 43% of cable subscribers polled
would drop their cable service and 23% would consider canceling if broadcast networks were
dropped from their offerings. Viewers See Networks as Essential Cable Offering, Roper Study
Finds, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, May 2, 1991, at 5.
170. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 325(b)(3)(A).
171. As Representative Boucher has suggested, in keeping with the sunset provision placed
on the comparable prohibitions in the fair access language of § 19, this proposed prohibition
could be limited to a period of 10 years, after which time the Commission could consider
whether the marketplace is sufficiently competitive to justify eliminating the prohibition. Id.
§ 628(c)(5).
172. FCC News Release, MM Dkt. No. 92-259 (Mar. 11, 1993), Report and Order
forthcoming.
173. Id.; Retransmission/Must Carry NPRM, supra note 147, at I 66-69.
HASTINGS Co3MM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 15:305
THE 1992 CABLE ACT
on exclusivity, or the decision be challenged in court, it would be appro-
priate to rely on the additional authority it has under the provision. The
legislative history indicates ample concern about the direct impact of re-
transmission consent on basic rates. 174 Moreover, the FCC's authority
under the 1992 Act to regulate basic rates arises only in the absence of
effective competition in the local market. The FCC must not and should
not ignore its authority and responsibility in the first instance to safe-
guard effective competition by assuring the availability of retransmitted
broadcast programming to cable competitors. Otherwise, Congress' goal
of promoting competition in the monopolized cable industry will never
be achieved. Should efforts be launched to overturn the FCC's ban on
retransmission consent exclusivity, the advocates of competition would
be well advised to use the various upcoming legislative vehicles relating
to this issue as an opportunity to clarify the statute by closing the re-
transmission exclusivity loophole.1"
III
Rate Regulation
When the opponents of the Cable Act of 1992 criticized the legisla-
tion as an unwarranted and onerous re-regulation of the cable industry,
they were necessarily referring to the rate regulation provisions in what
became section 3 of the Act. 176 It was, in fact, the inability of the cable
industry to fully recognize or deflect the genuine grassroots concern com-
municated by cable subscribers to legislators about the increasing cost of
174. As Senator Inouye has stated:
Cable has also asserted that retransmission will cause cable rates to increase .... On
the contrary, the Committee Report specifies that in its proceeding implementing
transmission consent, the FCC must ensure that local stations' retransmission rights
will be implemented with due concern for any impact on cable subscribers' rates ....
In addition, the FCC is also required to regulate the rates for the basic tier-this is
the tier that contains the broadcast signals-to make certain that those rates remain
reasonable. Thus, the FCC has a clear mandate to ensure that retransmission does
not result in harmful rate increases that we have seen flourishing throughout this
nation.
135 CONG. REC. S563 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1992) (comments of Senator Inouye); see also 138
CONG. REC. S14603 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992) (remarks of Senator Bradley (D-NJ)); 138
CONG. REc. H1477 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (veto message from President Bush).
175. Another legislative approach would be for fledgling competitors to be granted a statu-
tory exception to Retransmission Consent modeled after the FCC's 1959 decision that enabled
cable operators to retransmit without permission. CA TA and TV Repeater Services, 26
F.C.C. 403, 429-30 (1959).
176. Section 3 of the 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, amends § 623 of the Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 543 (1981). This provision not only affects the subscription rights to
basic and cable programming, but also the terms of leased commercial access and all aspects of
cable service. It is beyond the scope of this article to address each of these aspects of § 3 in
detail.
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cable service that, more than any other single factor, led to enactment. 177
Even if section 3, as implemented by the FCC, creates a regulatory briar
patch, it may be a thicket in which cable operators are relatively comfort-
able and a situation at least preferable to facing competition-despite
their protests to the contrary during the legislative process.
Viewed in the context of the whole Act, the rate regulation provi-
sions demonstrate a strong reluctance to dictate prices and a correspond-
ing preference for competition.1 78 In sum, until other measures yield a
more competitive market, Congress seeks to establish a system of rate
regulations that would result in prices for basic and cable programming
more closely approximating what might result from competitive market
prices. Moreover, when the extremely complicated, but ultimately rela-
tively modest, rate regulation provisions are applicable, their coverage is
so problematic and possibly so limited as to cast doubt on whether they
ultimately will generate significant consumer savings. The answer will be
found in the details of the FCC's herculean effort to issue regulations on
this, the most massive rulemaking initiative of the 1992 Act. 179 If, for
example, the FCC is able to enforce even a very modest price reduction
of as little as ten to fifteen percent off the price of basic service, it could
immediately save consumers a billion dollars.
A. Genesis, Exodus, Numbers
The 1984 Cable Act 8° is the initial reference point for the legislative
history of the rate regulation provisions in the 1992 Cable Act. The 1984
Cable Act was the first comprehensive federal policy for cable television.
Prior to its enactment, cable television was regulated principally at the
local level through the franchise process. 8 ' The 1984 Cable Act prohib-
ited local authorities from regulating the basic service rates of cable sys-
tems.' 82 Congress hoped deregulation would "enable the cable industry
to prosper, benefiting both consumers and industry participants alike." 183
177. See, e.g., Competitive Problems in the Cable Television Industry, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., Ist Sess. 161-201 (1989) (testimony and remarks of James P. Mooney, President
and C.E.O. of National Cable Television Ass'n).
178. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 3(a) (codified as amended, § 623(a), 47 U.S.C.
§ 543(c) (1980)).
179. See Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Rate Regulation, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, MM Dkt. No.
92-266, FCC 92-544 (Dec. 24, 1992) ("Rate Regulation NPRM"). FCC 92-544 is itself almost
100 pages long. The submissions from just the initial round of the comment period which were
available to the author weighed over 40 pounds and totaled over 3,500 pages.
180. See generally 1984 Cable Act, supra note 21.
181. House Report, supra note 9, at 29.
182. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 4.
183. House Report, supra note 9, at 29.
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Legislators intended to find a balance between the local franchising pro-
cess as the primary means of regulation while also encouraging the
growth of a new industry. Congress believed that the availability of com-
peting sources of programming would keep rates down and that local
franchising authorities would ensure that cable operators responded to
the needs of the community. 184
Since the 1984 Cable Act, cable television has experienced tremen-
dous growth. Cable penetration of thirty-seven percent of households in
1985 grew to sixty-one percent in 1992.185 Although the growth in the
cable industry has provided viewers with increased quality and diversity
in programming, the Senate and House committees became increasingly
concerned with the way cable systems treated consumers and abused
their market power in this deregulated atmosphere.186 Additionally, an-
ticipated competition from alternative sources of video programming,
such as wireless and the home satellite dish market, has failed to become
a force in the marketplace. Currently, cable competitors serve approxi-
mately five percent of American households. 187
The 1984 Cable Act deregulated rates for basic cable service where
there was "effective competition" as defined by the FCC. 188 A cable sys-
tem was considered to be subject to effective competition if the entire
community it served could receive three or more unduplicated broadcast
signals. 8 9 Under this standard, cable systems in approximately ninety-
seven percent of all communities were not rate regulated.' After four
years of deregulated cable service, the Chairman of the House Telecom-
munications Subcommittee, Congressman Edward Markey (D-MA), re-
quested that the GAO survey cable systems to determine the effect of
deregulation on rates.' 9 ' The GAO surveyed 2,000 of the then existing
11,000 cable systems. From 1,500 responses it concluded that monthly
rates for the lowest priced basic service increased by twenty-nine percent
and rates for the most popular basic cable service increased by twenty-six
percent. 192
The GAO report was criticized by some as representative of only a
small portion of the cable industry and by others as unrepresentative of
184. Id. at 30.
185. Id. at 29.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 30.
188. 47 U.S.C. § 543(b) (1988).
189. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 4; House Report, supra note 9, at 30-31.
190. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 4; House Report, supra note 9, at 30-31.
191. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 4; House Report, supra note 9, at 30-31.
192. See generally GAO Reports, supra note 19; Senate Report, supra note 8, at 5; House
Report, supra note 9, at 32.
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the worst cases of rate increases by some cable systems, which ran as
high as 94 to 204%. 193 GAO surveys conducted in 1990 and 1991 again
showed cable rates increasing at a rate at least twice that of inflation.1 94
Overall, the GAO found that during the first four years of deregulation,
the monthly charge for the lowest priced service increased by fifty-six
percent and for the most popular basic service by sixty-one percent-
increases of more than three times the rate of inflation. Additionally, at
least forty-five to fifty percent of the price increases since deregulation
were due to market power rather than to increases in costs.195
The FCC eventually revised its definition of "effective competition"
to be "either (1) six unduplicated over-the-air broadcast signals, or (2) a
competing multichannel video provider available to 50 percent of the
homes passed by the existing cable system and subscribed to by at least
10 percent of the homes passed." '196 According to the GAO, however,
the rates of only twenty percent of the nation's cable subscribers would
be regulated under the new definition. 197 Customers and cable competi-
tors continued to complain that the FCC's new standard did not obviate
the need for a legislative approach to protect consumers, because cable
systems continued to enjoy a constructive monopoly in the local markets.
B. Leviticus
The resulting legislation, section 3 of the 1992 Cable Act, is
designed to encourage competition and to rely on greater governmental
oversight of the cable industry where no competition exists.1 98 The 1992
Cable Act repeals the deregulatory framework of the 1984 Cable Act and
imposes rate regulations on systems found not to be subject to "effective
competition."' 9 9 Section 3 establishes two separate rate regulatory sys-
tems. First, rates for the "basic service tier" will be subject to regulation
in almost every cable community, provided that the FCC certifies that
the local franchise authorities have adopted regulations consistent with
193. Senate Report, supra note 8, at 5-6; see also Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 43, at
156, 188, 218, and 223; Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1989, supra note 43, at 456; cf
Senate Report, supra note 8, at 94-98 (minority views of Senators Packwood, Stevens, and
Bums, arguing that increases were due to rates being kept artificially low prior to
deregulation).
194. See generally GAO Reports, supra note 19; House Report, supra note 9, at 32.
195. 138 CONG. REC. 5413, S425 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1992) (statements of Senators Danforth
and Gore citing an Aug. 1991 Justice Department study, Market Power and Price Increases for
Basic Cable Service Since Deregulation).
196. Re-examination of the Effective Competition Standard for the Regulation of Cable Tel-
evision Basic Service Rates, 6 FCC Rcd. 4545 (1991). See Senate Report, supra note 8, at 8.
197. See generally GAO Reports, supra note 19; House Report, supra note 9, at 33-34.
198. House Report, supra note 9, at 24.
199. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 623(a)(2).
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FCC rules.2" Second, rates for "cable programming services other than
programming carried on the basic tier will be regulated by the FCC if,
upon complaint, the FCC finds that such rates are 'unreasonable.' "20
Programming offered on a per channel or per program basis is exempt
from such regulation. The Act also prohibits operators from imposing
"buy through" requirements,2"2 and establishes regulations pertaining to
many other aspects of cable service such as the geographic structure of
rates and rate discrimination within a franchise area, negative option bill-
ing, and the collection of information about rates and billing.20 3
Unlike the access to programming language that was largely derived
from the House bill and language originally offered by Representative
Billy Tauzin (D-LA),2 4 or the Retransmission Consent language that
was adopted in conference from the Senate bill,205 the rate regulation
language of the 1992 Cable Act was a complete amalgam and a revision
of the relevant portions of both the Senate bill and the House bill.
The explanation of these changes in the Conference Report is essen-
tial to understanding the nature of the resulting compromise language.20 6
When analyzing the resulting language it is imperative to keep track of
the prior source of the language and to determine accurately which prior
statements, if any, in the legislative history are relevant to Congressional
intent in incorporating specific language drafted by the conferees and en-
acted into law. For example, working from the House bill's language
and format, the Conference Report adopts the Senate bill's basic rate
regulation standard (i.e., that the FCC ensure that rates are reason-
able)2 7 and establishes a new standard for defining what is reasonable
(i.e., regulated basic rates should not exceed competitive market
prices). 20 8
The conferees adopted and tightened the factors the House bill had
required the FCC to take into account to ensure reasonable basic rates,
including limitations on costs that may be allocated and recovered in the
200. Id. § 623(b). If the local franchise authority fails to gain certification, or the FCC
subsequently revokes its certification, then the FCC is to regulate the basic service tier in that
community. Id.
201. Id. § 623(c).
202. Id. § 623(b)(8).
203. See generally id. § 623.
204. Conference Report, supra note 5, at 93.
205. Id. at 76-77.
206. Id. at 58-66. The following discussion closely tracks the analysis of the Consumer
Federation of America, which through its Legislative Director Gene Kimmelman was perhaps
the chief "outside" architect of § 3. See Comments to Rate Regulation NPRM of Consumer
Federation of America ["CFA"], at 5-11.
207. Conference Report, supra note 5, at 62.
208. Id.
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rates charged for basic service.2' The Conference Report further limits
the portion of franchise fees, taxes, and other charges imposed by state
and local authorities on cable operators and other costs that may be re-
covered through basic rates.210 The Conference Report also modifies the
House bill's "reasonable profit" provision,21 allowing the FCC to con-
sider the profit on nonbasic services when determining a reasonable profit
for basic service.
In establishing procedures to determine whether the rates for
nonbasic or "cable programming services" are unreasonable, the confer-
ees worked from the House bill. Cable programming that is offered on
the basic service tier would already be governed by the FCC reasonable
rate regulation and would not be subject to complaints of unreasonable
rates.2" 2 Cable subscribers are given standing to file a complaint based
upon a "minimum showing," rather than the requirement in both the
Senate and the House bills that a complaint demonstrate a "prima facie
case." 3 Significantly, the Conference Report adopts the House bill's
provision allowing complaints to be filed against existing rates for cable
programming services 180 days after basic rate regulation goes into ef-
fect.214 Complaints need not await a rate increase, as was proposed in
the Senate bill.215
Finally, the Conference Report adopted with modifications the
House language giving the FCC broad residual authority to prevent eva-
sions of rate regulation, including evasions that result from so-called
"retiering. '216
C. Effective Competition
The linchpin of the rate regulations is the section 3 statutory defini-
tion of "effective competition."2 7 Under the Act, a cable system faces
"effective competition" and therefore is not subject to rate regulations21 8
209. Id.
210. Id. at 63.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 64.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 61; 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 623(d).
215. Conference Report, supra note 5, at 64; 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 623(c)(3).
216. Conference Report, supra note 5, at 65; 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 623(h).
217. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 623(a)(1). This definition replaces the definition of
the term that the FCC adopted pursuant to the 1984 Cable Act.
218. Id. § 623(a)(2). An issue arises as to whether the exemption applies just to regulation
of the rates of the basic tier of service and regulating unreasonable rates of other cable pro-
gramming services. It could be argued that an exempted cable operator is not exempt from the
related requirements of § 3, which deal with uniform rate structure, discriminatory pricing,
negative option billing, etc. At present it is likely this issue will be of limited significance
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if: (1) fewer than thirty percent of the households in the franchise area
subscribe to the service of a cable system; (2) the cable system and an-
other unaffiliated multichannel distributor each offer comparable pro-
gramming to at least fifty percent of the households in the franchise area,
and fifteen percent of the households actually subscribe to multichannel
distributors other than the largest distributor; or (3) the local franchising
authority itself operates a multichannel distributor that offers program-
ming to at least fifty percent of the households in the franchise area.219
Under this definition, most existing cable systems are not subject to effec-
tive competition and would face rate regulation.
The possible rationale behind the first alternative prong of this statu-
tory definition is not obvious. It is not intuitively clear how there is "ef-
fective competition" when fewer than thirty percent of the households in
a franchise area subscribe to cable. In fact, there are two rationales for
this somewhat odd part of the definition. First, this provision creates a
"safe harbor" from rate regulation in order to encourage the extension of
cable into unwired areas and to encourage the rapid expansion of cable
service within a franchise area. Without this exemption, it could be ar-
gued that section 3 might discourage the expansion of cable service to
previously unserved households. Second, in a franchise area with fewer
than thirty percent of the households subscribing, the local cable opera-
tor arguably has only limited ability to exert the monopoly power that
would justify rate regulation. Thus, the first prong of the definition does
not cover real-world situations where competition exists, and conse-
quently such "fewer than thirty percent" markets should not be referred
to by the FCC in calculating what prices would look like in markets
where effective competition exists.
There are a host of issues involved in applying the new "effective
competition" definition in practice: for example, the information that
will be required to be submitted about subscribers and how, on a case-by-
case basis, it will be determined that multichannel distributors within a
franchise area are competing by virtue of offering "comparable
programming."
The tentative approach of the FCC is to make its required "finding"
of effective competition by deferring to the determination of the local
franchising authority on the issue.220 The FCC's view requires that the
local authority's initial finding should be submitted as part of the re-
because the number of cable systems that face effective competition is tiny. If, however, the
1992 Cable Act succeeds in stimulating competition the question will become more pressing.
219. Id. § 623(l)(1).
220. Rate Regulation NPRM, supra note 179, at 17. Some issues, however, the FCC is
likely to decide, such as whether the statutory phrase "offered" means "available." Id. at 8.
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quired certification process, designed to make the local authority eligible
to regulate rates. The FCC reasons that this is appropriate because the
absence of effective competition is a prerequisite to the legal authority
and, therefore, to the certifiability of the local authority to regulate
rates.22" ' In addition, it contends that franchising authorities are in a su-
perior position to gather the facts necessary to make an effective competi-
tion finding. Apparently, the FCC is considering resolving disputes that
might arise over local effective competition determinations through the
certification revocation proceedings provided for in section 3.222 This ap-
proach by the FCC demonstrates an important way in which section 3 is
often ambiguous when determining whether regulatory authority over
cable operators will reside at the federal or local level.
D. Shared Regulatory Responsibility
In many respects section 3 imposes shared responsibilities on both
the FCC and the local franchising authority. For example, before the
basic service tier can be regulated locally, the franchising authority must
be certified by the FCC, and only local rate regulations must comply
with FCC rules.223
The FCC is authorized to regulate basic rates after a franchising
authority has been disapproved for certification or if its certification has
been revoked, until the local authority requalifies.224 The statute, how-
ever, is unclear whether the FCC has authority to regulate basic rates
should the local franchising authority choose not to file for certification.
The FCC tentatively concludes that it lacks independent authority to ini-
tiate regulation of basic service rates when the local franchising authority
does not assert regulatory jurisdiction over basic cable service.225 Some
commentators make a convincing argument to the contrary based on the
Conference Report and the floor debate on the rate regulation provi-
sions. 22 6 However, the FCC's proposed reliance on the local authority to
221. Id.
222. Id. See also 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 623(a)(5) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 543(a)(5)).
223. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 623(a)(2)-(3). Other examples include the FCC's min-
imum customer service standards that local authorities may exceed. Id. § 632. In addition,
the FCC will decide the minimum contents of transfer requests that are, under the statute, to
be decided by the local authority. Id. § 617(d).
224. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 1, § 623(a)(6).
225. Rate Regulation NPRM, supra note 179, at 20.
226. See, e.g., CFA, supra note 206, at 124-28 (describing floor debates). The Conference
Report states that "section 623(b) is amended to state that the Commission shall, by regula-
tion, ensure that rates for the basic service tier are reasonable, and the goal of such regulations
is to protect subscribers of any cable system that is not subject to effective competition
Conference Report, supra note 5, at 62 (emphasis added).
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make the threshold determination of effective competition strongly sug-
gests that it does not plan to engage in regulation of basic rates where the
local authority is itself inactive.227 This decision, if adhered to by the
FCC in its final rule, could have a major impact on determining how
many communities and how quickly local rates are regulated. If, for ex-
ample, a large number of local governments for a variety of reasons do
not initiate the certification process, this will create a regulatory vacuum
that the FCC will decline to enter. This is precisely the problem that the
1992 Cable Act rate regulation provisions were designed to address.
While the tandem arrangement in the statute for regulatory respon-
sibility may have some practical advantages, it further complicates the
intricacies of the new rate regulation system. At a minimum, a signifi-
cant period of adjustment and experience will be necessary to determine
whether the regime implemented by the FCC under the 1992 Cable Act
is workable and yields regulated rates that approximate rates in a com-
petitive marketplace.
Conclusion
Some of the more cynical wags out and about Capitol Hill have
dubbed the 1992 Cable Act the "Lawyer's Full Employment Act of
1992." An uncharitable barb-but one that may bear some truth consid-
ering the legal battalions and giga-reams of paper already devoted to is-
sues arising over its implementation. And, in defending some of the less
elegant, more Rube Goldbergesque provisions of this ambitious new law,
one is tempted to dust off the aphorisms about the legislative process
concerning "staying out of the kitchen at fine restaurants," and the ad-
vice to sausage aficionados about not watching the tasty links being
made. None of this is to say that the 1992 Cable Act is not an important,
timely, and in many respects, impressive effort by Congress grappling
with serious problems in the video marketplace.
If implemented in a manner at all consistent with Congressional in-
tent, the access to programming provisions of the Act will yield a mar-
ketplace that is substantially more hospitable to cable competitors and
will deliver the benefits of competition to consumers. If the FCC pro-
vides competitors with anything resembling a simplified and less costly
alternative to litigation for resolving disputes over their ability to obtain
desirable programming, this result can be achieved. The prohibitions in
the Act against anticompetitive practices are themselves clear and,
should competitors find any reasonable enforcement procedure available
at the FCC, the Act's access provisions could well become self-enforcing
227. Rate Regulation NPRM, supra note 179, at 15.
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as parties assess the risks and bring their conduct into compliance. There
has been, and will continue to be once the FCC rulemaking concludes,
vigorous opposition in court to the implementation of the access provi-
sions. Such challenges are to be expected and, when the dust settles,
might well have little impact on the applicable rules governing the ability
of competitors to obtain fair access to programming. The extensive rec-
ord amassed by Congress over many years is compelling, and the statu-
tory approach is rather measured in light of some of the plausible
alternatives (e.g., compulsory license, divestiture) that might have been
enacted to promote competition. The prospects for overturning in court
the more modest access provisions that Congress instead adopted appear
remote. Over the long run the access to programming provisions may
prove to be the most important parts of the Act in terms of delivering to
consumers the lasting benefits of competition.
In contrast, the 1992 Cable Act certainly will not be the last word
on the Must Carry/Retransmission Consent/Compulsory License saga.
This controversy is one of those fights that at times looks like a dispute
between the wealthy and the very rich. All the participants are likely to
carry on in court and in Congress no matter what the forthcoming FCC
report and order on this subject requires, and whatever the outcome of
the pending constitutional challenge to sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Act.
This has been so for the industries touched by these issues for the last
three decades, and it might well be so for decades to come.
It is considerably more difficult to forecast the future of the new rate
regulation rules. They were enacted with the best intentions and might
in time accomplish the objective of moderating cable pricing practices.
One particular problem with the rate regulations is that they address a
market which, even since the very recent enactment of the Act, is chang-
ing at a dizzying pace.228 Innovations and the possibilities of competition
from new sectors of the telecommunications industry,229 such as the tele-
phone industry, might make the rate regulations of the 1992 Cable Act
outmoded before they can be truly tested. On the other hand, the FCC
will be challenged to breathe flexibility and life into these regulations and
228. See, e.g., Paul Farhi, Time- Warner Plans 2- Way Cable System, WASH. POST, Jan. 27,
1993, at Fl.
229. See, e.g., Harry Jessell, The Telcos are Coming, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 1,
1993, at 10 (summary of various forays into video services by Bell Atlantic, GTE, NYNEX,
Pacific Telesis, Southwestern Bell, and USWest); Rich Brown, Southwestern Bell Makes First
RBOC Cable Entry for $650 Million, BROADCASTING, Feb. 15, 1993, at 3; Geraldine
Fabrikant, Phone Company Breaks Ground By Buying Into Cable Television, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
10, 1993, at Al; Paul Farhi, Baby Bell Seeks Speedier Deregulation, WASH. POST, Feb. 23,
1993, at DI; Anthony Ramirez, Ameritech Offers to End Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
1993, at D5.
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into the rest of the Act to keep apace of the breakneck technological
change.
In many ways the enactment of the 1992 Cable Act represents Con-
gress at its best. There were many architects of this complex new law in
both the Senate and the House of Representatives who all deserve credit
for their creativity, skill, and perseverance. While the Act may remind
one of a building constructed by many different hands and in many dif-
ferent stages, its interrelated structure should work as a whole. The FCC
is laboring mightily and is conscientiously adhering to the almost impos-
sible timetable set by Congress for issuing regulations to implement the
Act. Every indication is that the FCC is shouldering this challenge with
dedication and professionalism, and the result may well also provide an
example of a federal agency at its best. Consequently, the end of the era
of an unregulated cable monopoly is in sight. In its place is the beginning
of a new legal regime that will govern the changing television market-
place on into the next century.

